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Abstract of the Dissertation
Essays in Mutual Funds
by
Aadhaar Verma
Doctor of Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2022
Prof. Zachary Kaplan, Chair

This dissertation examines mutual fund portfolio formation, the economic forces that determine
how fund managers construct their portfolios, and the market effects of fund portfolio disclosures.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I study how funds modify their portfolios around disclosure
dates in order to cater to their investors’ non-financial preferences. Using social norms and investor
boycotts surrounding tobacco and firearm sectors as a proxy for non-financial preferences, I find
that these stocks experience significant negative returns on portfolio disclosure dates and
significant positive returns on the day after the portfolio disclosure. I also find that funds accelerate
their trading activity in these stocks after the portfolio disclosure. These results suggest that
investors’ non-financial preferences can result in temporary fluctuations in asset prices around
mutual fund portfolio disclosure dates. In the second chapter, co-authored with Todd Gormley and
Zachary Kaplan, I examine how fund trades and stock prices vary around the quarterly fund
reporting cycle. Mutual funds accelerate trades that complete the building of existing positions by
disclosure dates but delay trades that initiate new positions until after the portfolio disclosure.
Consistent with disclosure-based motives unrelated to new information about intrinsic values
driving these quarterly trade dynamics, both stock price informativeness and commissions paid by
funds drop at quarter-end.
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Chapter 1
(Mis)-priced preferences: The effect of

investor preferences on asset prices
1.1 Introduction
Most academic papers model sophisticated investing in capital markets as a rational
process. However, like most social phenomena, investing is subject to fads, speculation, social and
cultural mores (Shiller, 1984).1 Generally speaking, if investors prefer to hold stock A, rather than
stock B, they will accept lower returns for doing so. Moreover, if the demand for stock A stems
from an attribute independent of its fundamental value, this could result in A’s stock price
deviating from its intrinsic value (Black, 1986; pg. 537).
In this paper, I empirically document how investor preferences affect asset prices by
showing how security returns vary around mutual fund portfolio disclosure days in systematic and
predictable ways. While mutual fund returns are observable on a daily level, their portfolios are
disclosed to the general market only once each quarter. This results in funds placing more weight
on those securities they think their investors would wish (or not wish) to see reported in their
portfolios. We argue that this shift in and out of specific stocks around quarter-ends generates a
predictable return pattern allowing us to identify when and how preferences affect asset prices.

Consider the recent rise of ‘meme stocks’ in which stocks are hyped using internet slang and jokes on social networking websites
such as Reddit and Discord, resulting in wild price swings for stocks like GameStop, AMC, Blackberry, among others.
1
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This approach has two underlying assumptions: (i) funds concentrate their trades to cater to
investor preferences around disclosure dates, and (ii) liquidity providers do not supply the required
amount of liquidity to cancel out the price changes caused by the funds’ trading behavior around
quarter ends.
To analyze how investors’ preferences affect asset prices, we examine security returns
around quarter-ends (when most funds disclose their portfolios) in two ‘sin’ industries – tobacco
and firearms. These industries have been subject to numerous investor boycotts (see Appendix A).
If fund managers cater to their investors’ preferences by avoiding reporting holdings in these
sectors, we should find depressed prices around reporting days for stocks in these sectors. This is
precisely what we find. We show that these sectors exhibit significant negative returns on quarterend dates and significant positive returns on quarter-beginning dates. Relative to other industries,
we find that tobacco (firearm) firms exhibit 45 (39) basis points lower returns on the day just before
the portfolio disclosure relative to their non-sin counterparts. After the disclosure event (i.e., the
first day of the quarter), tobacco (firearm) stocks experience 40 (27) basis point higher returns than
their non-sin counterparts. These returns are robust to controlling for firm characteristics and asset
pricing anomalies, which suggests that the flip in returns around quarter-ends arises from fund
reporting requirements which in turn, we argue, are driven by investor preferences.
Given that our sample runs from 1986 to 2019, it is likely that investors’ preferences
towards these sectors have changed over time. To examine this, we divide our sample into each
decade and re-run our analysis. We find that tobacco stocks’ negative (positive) returns around
quarter-end (beginning) dates become significant only from the 1990s. This was when federal and
local US states started public litigation against tobacco companies for misleading the public about
the health risks associated with tobacco consumption. We also observe that investors’ preference
5

not to hold firearm stocks was limited to the 2000s after the rise in mass shooting incidents which
led to appeals from advocacy groups to institutional investors to divest their positions from firearm
stocks. These results are consistent with the possibility that investors’ preferences towards
particular sectors vary with time.
Next, we examine whether the return patterns documented in sin stocks extend to the set
of firms implicated in the prescription opioid epidemic that affected large parts of the US in the
2010s.2 Analogous to how advocacy groups placed pressure on institutional investors to divest
from their tobacco and firearm holdings, the opioid epidemic led to calls for institutional investors
to engage with opioid manufacturers and distributors to address the risks associated with
reputational harm and potential legal costs arising from opioid misuse (see Appendix A, Panel C).
We identify nine publicly listed firms charged with profiting from the opioid crisis and examine
whether investors’ preferences effects these firms’ asset prices around quarter-end dates when
most mutual funds and institutional investors disclose their portfolio holdings. We find that
implicated firms experience a significant negative (positive) 24 (30) basis point return on quarterend (start) dates. This pattern of returns is felt most acutely in pharmaceutical distribution firms
and retail pharmacies whose returns fall (increase) by 21 (34) and 37 (24) basis points on quarterend (start) dates, respectively.
To ascertain whether investors’ nonpecuniary preferences affect asset prices more broadly
in the cross-section, we turn to stock return performance of highly rated ESG (environmental,
social and, governance) around portfolio disclosure dates. While the traditional view, stemming
from Friedman (1970) argues that the only responsibility of firms is to increase its shareholder

2

For a comprehensive timeline of the opioid epidemic in the United States, see the following CDC page:
https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/basics/epidemic.html
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value, recent studies (e.g. Bollen, 2007; Riedl and Smeets, 2017) show that at least some investors
derive utility from holding firms that score high on sustainability and social responsibility metrics.
If such investors comprise a sizeable market segment, then funds would have an incentive to report
larger positions in highly rated ESG stocks to become more desirable in the eyes of such investors.
Showing higher portfolio positions in highly rated ESG stocks would help attract higher
investment flows from existing and potential investors and maximize assets under management
(Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019). Furthermore, Chen et al., 2020 show that an increase in firm’s
institutional holding improves their CSR performance. This leads us to hypothesize that highly
rated ESG firms with high mutual fund presence will experience positive returns around quarterend dates.
We provide evidence supporting this hypothesis. Highly rated ESG stocks with low mutual
fund presence experience significant negative returns of 35 basis points on quarter-ends. This
negative association between highly rated ESG stocks is consistent with previous findings (e.g.,
Krüger, 2015, Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014, Manchiraju and Rajgopal, 2017), which document a
negative relationship between ‘corporate goodness’ and shareholder value. On the other hand, we
show that stocks with high mutual fund presence experience a significant positive return of 113
basis points on the last trading day of the quarter. Splitting the ESG score into its constituent
components, we find that stocks with high environmental and social scores and high mutual fund
presence experience a positive return of 34 and 85 basis points on the last day of the quarter. Highly
rated governance stocks (with or without mutual fund presence) do not experience significant
returns around quarter-ends.
Finally, we use fund-level trades from Abel-Noser (formerly Ancerno) from 1998-2010 to
capture funds’ trading dynamics around disclosure dates. Because only tobacco and firearm stocks
7

exhibit negative stocks around quarter-end dates during this period, we limit our analysis of fund
trading behavior to only these sectors. We begin our analysis by first creating a measure that
captures how funds’ trading patterns change in response to their current trade while also capturing
funds’ past trading patterns in that security. We create a trading slope measure for each fund’s
trade in a particular security by computing the ratio of the change in the fund’s position in that
security in the four weeks after that trade to the difference in the fund’s position in the four weeks
before that trade. A positive slope measure with a magnitude of less (greater) than 1 implies that
the fund continues to trade in that security but at a slower (faster) rate than it had done so in the
preceding four weeks. On the other hand, a negative slope would suggest that the fund reverses its
trades by buying (selling) securities that it had sold (bought) in the prior four weeks.
We show that funds significantly alter their trading activity in sin stocks around quarterends by increasing their trades after they have disclosed their positions. While funds’ trading
activity in non-sin stocks increases by 8.9% on quarter-start dates, their trading activity in tobacco
(firearm) stocks increases by 50% (126%). This increase in trading activity on the quarter-start
dates suggests that funds strategically delay their trades in sin-stocks until they disclose their
portfolios. When we partition funds into net buyers and net sellers in the month before the
disclosure, we find that funds are more likely to delay the sin stocks’ purchases until after the
disclosure date. More specifically, we show that conditional on funds having bought sin stocks in
the month before the disclosure, funds increase their purchases by 76% in the month after the
disclosure.
This paper makes key contributions to at least three streams of literature. First, our evidence
contributes to our knowledge of how investor preferences can result in dynamic mispricing. While
the extant literature usually models return anomalies as either misestimation of cash flows or
8

investors’ behavioral biases, we show how their preferences for non-financial aspects of stocks
can also result in mispricing and return predictability. Engelberg et al. (2018) show that anomaly
returns are significantly higher on corporate news days and earnings announcement days. Patton
and Verardo (2012) find that the daily betas of individual stocks increase on earnings
announcement days and revert to their average levels in two to five days. Gormley et al. (2021)
show that disclosure requirements induce a dynamic pattern in fund trading, leading funds to
complete positions on quarter-end days and begin trading after disclosure dates. This paper extends
these findings by showing how disclosure requirements affects trading in stocks investors prefer
to own. We show predictable price changes and dynamic patterns in portfolio formation that allow
funds to present these holdings.
Relatedly, this paper contributes to the growing literature that examines the market impact
of investors’ non-financial firm preferences. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001)
examine how investors’ preferences to hold locally domiciled firms affect asset prices. Similarly,
Brunnermeir et al. (2007) and Harris et al. (2015) examine the price effects of investor screens on
highly skewed returns and assured dividend yields, respectively. Viewed in this manner, our paper
is closely related to Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), who show that social norms result in sin stocks
yielding higher returns and, Chava (2014), who shows firms with greater environmental concerns
face a higher cost of capital.
Finally, this study expands our knowledge of how mandatory portfolio disclosure affects
fund trading decisions. Prior studies show that portfolio disclosure incentivizes fund managers to
execute trades to either mask their actual positions to either prevent copycat trades ( e.g., Wermers,
2001; Poterba et al., 2004; Gormley et al., 2021) or to deceive investors about the actual state of
their investment portfolios (e.g., Musto, 1997 and 1999; Meier and Schaumburg, 2004; Agarwal
9

et al., 2014). Our study contributes to this research by documenting how funds alter their portfolios
to make them more attractive to existing and potential investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the
data sources and presents summary statistics. Section 3 shows how investors’ preferences result in
temporary mispricing in sin stocks and opioid stocks around quarter-ends when most funds
disclose their portfolio holdings. We also broaden our analysis to examine the effect of investors’
preferences on asset prices by examining the asset returns of highly rated ESG stocks around
quarter-end dates in this section. Section 4 examines how funds’ alter their trading dynamics
around disclosure dates. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.

1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.2.1 Market Data
We construct our dataset by obtaining the daily prices of securities held from CRSP,
limiting the sample to common shares (i.e., share code 10 or 11) that trade on the NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ and have a prior month-end market capitalization of 10 million USD or higher. We
require all observations to have pricing factors identified in the asset pricing literature – beta, total
asset growth, book-to-market ratio, market value of equity, gross-profitability (Fama and French,
2016; Novy-Marx, 2013), and post-earnings announcement drift (measured using standardized
unexpected earnings). Our independent variables of interest are two indicator variables that flag
key dates when most funds record their holdings for subsequent disclosures. The first indicator,
QtrEnd, captures the last trading day of each calendar-year quarter (i.e., the last trading day of
March, June, September, and December), and the second indicator, QtrBeg, captures the first
trading day of each calendar-year quarter (i.e., the first trading day of January, April, July and
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October). We also construct similar month-end (MosEnd) and month-beginning (MosBeg)
indicators when some minority of funds record their holdings but do not report the results on these
indicators for the sake of brevity.
1.2.2 Identifying sin and opioid stocks
To identify sin stocks, we follow the approach laid out in Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009. A
firm is identified as a sin stock if it or any of its segments have a SIC code ranging from 21002199 (tobacco stock) or equal to 3482 or 3484 (firearm stocks). We then compute the percentage
of sales that a firm derives from its tobacco or firearm segments. Panel A of Table 1 presents the
number of sin stocks in our dataset starting from 1985 to 2019. The total number of distinct tobacco
and firearm stocks in our sample are 41 and 19, respectively. The average percentage of sales
derived from tobacco (firearms) sales is 74.92% (60.49%). We merge these sin-sale measures with
our market-level data on the last year’s sales.
[Insert Table 1 – Panel A here]
We identify firms accused of exacerbating the opioid crisis by parsing through the
defendants listed in the most prominent lawsuits filed by public prosecutors at the federal, state,
and county levels.3 The firms charged in these lawsuits fall under three major categories –
distributors, retailers, and manufacturers. While the total number of accused firms is over 20, many
of these firms are private (e.g., Purdue Pharma) or have been acquired by other firms (e.g., AbbVie
acquired Allergan in 2015). As a result, the final number of firms in our opioid tests number 9:
three distributors, four retailers, and two manufacturers. We list the firms below:

3

A timeline of the major lawsuits and their decisions can be found here:
https://www.opioidsettlementtracker.com/globalsettlementtracker
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Distributor
Cardinal Health
McKesson Corp.
AmerisourceBergen Corp.

Retailer
Walmart
CVS
Walgreens
Rite Aid

Manufacturer
Johnson & Johnson
Teva Pharmaceuticals

1.2.3 ESG stocks
We obtain ESG scores from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database. KLD,
now part of MSCI, is an information intermediary specializing in quantifying stakeholder relations
of publicly listed firms. While KLD scores for US corporations have been available since 1991,
their coverage remained limited to the S&P 500 until 2003. We limit our analysis from the year
2010 onwards because ESG concerns have become increasingly relevant in recent years. To
quantify ESG performance, KLD relies on publicly available information gathered through press
releases, 10-Ks, and other customized press searches. KLD classifies the data into one of the
following seven stakeholder areas: (i) community, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) diversity, (iv)
employee relations, (v) environment, (vi) human rights and, (vii) product. To ease our analysis,
we group all stakeholder areas that are not corporate governance and environment under the
‘social’ category giving us three stakeholder categories. In each of the seven areas, KLD defines
binary indicators, which are either strengths (positive) or concerns (negative). For example, a
positive indicator might be concerned with offering its employees paid maternity/paternity leave,
and a negative employee indicator could be concerned with the proportion of women in managerial
positions. For each firm’s stakeholder area, we take the sum of the strengths and concerns to obtain
the firm’s raw stakeholder score. Because the number of strengths and concerns vary across the
sample period, we standardize each firm’s raw score by the maximum possible score in that year.
[Insert Figure 01 here]
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Because KLD rating criteria change annually, firm ratings can vary widely from one year
to the next. This is evident in Figure 01, where we can see that the average firm’s environment
rating declined from 0.55 in 2009 to 0.20 in 2019. Therefore, using the raw standardized ratings
in the regression analysis could lead to biased coefficients. To account for such changes, we
compute the monthly percentile rank of each firm’s stakeholder score before using them in the
regressions.
1.2.4 Fund and institutional holding intensity
We use S12 and 13F/S34 datasets from Refinitiv to compute firm measures for the level of
mutual fund and institutional investor presence. We define MFOwn (InstOwn) as the percentage
of a firm’s market capitalization held by mutual funds (institutional investors) on a given date.
Specifically, we define MFOwn as:

𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =

∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1

where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are fund’s j disclosed holdings in firm i at time t. We split-adjust and value all the
positions using last year’s price and then sum the holding amount across all funds to create an
aggregate measure of the value of fund disclosures in a given stock at a date level. We then scale
the measure with the firm’s market capitalization to create the fund ownership intensity measure.
We create a similar measure using the S34/13F dataset to create an institutional ownership
intensity measure. To mitigate the presence of outliers, we winsorize both measures at 1% and
99%. We examine the effect of mutual fund and institutional ownership on highly related ESG
stock returns around disclosure dates in Section 4 of the paper.
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1.2.5 Trade dynamics data
Finally, we use the Ancerno proprietary dataset from Abel Noser Solutions, a financial
services firm that provides trading cost analytics advice to institutional asset owners, managers,
and brokers, such as mutual funds and pension funds, to assess whether funds alter their trades in
sin stocks around disclosure days. The Ancerno dataset allows us to observe trade-level data from
institutions that subscribe to Abel Noser’s services, covering about 12 percent of CRSP trading
volume (Hu et al., 2018). The data includes the date of fund managers’ transactions, the stock
symbol of the trade, the number and value of shares traded, and any commissions paid. While
Abel-Noser anonymizes the data at the institutional/fund manager level, they provide identification
codes for fund managers, allowing researchers to track a fund’s trades for a given security over
time. For our analysis, we include only those transactions by Ancerno marks as ‘good trades’ (i.e.,
actually executed trades) over the period 1998-2010, reflecting the earliest and the latest years of
the Ancerno data made available to researchers. Finally, since our analysis requires an estimate of
a fund’s position in a given security, we require funds to trade a security at least five times during
the sample period.
For each trade, we take the ratio of the change in the fund’s position in a security in the
four weeks following that day’s trade to the change in the fund’s position in that security in the
past four weeks of that day’s trade. Specifically, we define ShareSlope as:

𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =

𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+28 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−28

where 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the estimated position of fund i in security s at time t. A positive slope
measure would suggest that a fund, in the subsequent four weeks, continues to buy/sell the security
in the same direction as it had traded in the past four weeks. On the other hand, a negative slope
14

indicates that the fund reverses its previous trades by purchasing (selling) securities that it had sold
(bought) in the past four weeks. An illustration will help make this measure more transparent. Fund
21200735 in our sample held 42,600 shares of permno 10025 as of 10/17/2006. The same fund
held 41,900 shares and 42,200 shares of 10025 as of 11/14/2006 and 09/19/2006, respectively.
Thus, ShareSlope for permno 10025 on 10/17/2006 equals

41900−42600
42600−42400

=

−700
400

= −1.75. The

negative value of ShareSlope indicates that the fund reverses the position that it had built up in the
security in the past four weeks. Additionally, the absolute value greater than 1 indicates that the
fund exits its position in the security at a greater speed than it had initially entered into the security.
We discuss the construction and interpretation of the ShareSlope measure at greater length in
Appendix B of the paper.
[Insert Table 1 – Panel B here]
Panel B of Table 1 presents the summary statistics for ShareSlope for regular stocks and
sin stocks around key dates. The average slope measure of our sample for non-sin stocks on nonquarter beginning or ending dates is 1.34, which suggests a high degree of autocorrelation.
Specifically, it suggests that if a fund had purchased/sold 100 shares of a security in the past four
weeks, it follows up on that trade by buying/selling 134 shares of that security in the next four
weeks. We observe that while ShareSlope for non-sin stocks increases marginally to 1.39 on
quarter-beginning dates, the corresponding value for sin stocks equals 1.94, suggesting that funds
increase their trading activity in sin stocks until they have disclosed their holdings to the general
market. We explore how funds alter their trading activity in sin stocks in greater length in Section
5 of the paper.
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1.3. Investors preferences for sin stocks and opioid stocks
1.3.1 Sin stocks’ returns around portfolio disclosure days
We start our analysis by examining whether sin stocks (i.e., tobacco and firearm firms)
exhibit negative returns on portfolio reporting days. Our main hypothesis is that funds will wish
to avoid reporting holdings of cigarette stocks because cigarettes are an addictive product that
causes lung cancer and because the CEOs of these corporations misled the public about the risks
associated with the consumption of tobacco products. Similarly, we hypothesize that funds will
wish to avoid reporting firearm stocks in their portfolios because firearm manufacturers facilitate
the general public’s access to large magazine clips and semi-automatic firearms, increasing the
casualty figures in mass shootings. To test whether fund manager preferences not to hold these
securities around portfolio reporting days affect their asset prices, we regress the daily firm returns
on quarter-end and quarter-beginning indicators, the most common date on which funds record
and disclose their positions. Specifically, we estimate:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽2 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3 . 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 . 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽5 . 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(1)

where QtrEnd and QtrBeg are indicator variables that take a value of 1 if the day is the quarter’s
last and first trading day, respectively. SinSalei,t is defined as the sum of the percentage of sales
generated from the tobacco and firearm sectors. The prediction that fund managers sell these
holdings in response to reporting requirements predicts negative returns for these stocks on
quarter-ends and positive returns on quarter-beginnings. In all specifications, we also include (i)
indicators for the last trading day of the month (MosEnd) and the first trading day of the month
(MosBeg) and their interactions with SinSalei,t, (ii) month-year fixed effects, (iii) firm fixed effects,
and (iv) asset pricing factors – namely asset growth, book-to-market ratio, beta, gross profitability,
16

12-month momentum, market value of equity, and SUE and their interactions with the change in
quarter and month indicators. However, for the sake of brevity, we do not report these coefficients
in the main tables.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In Table 2, Column 1, we see that regular stocks experience a positive return of 27 basis
points on the last trading of the quarter. This is consistent with portfolio pumping (Carhart et al.,
2002). In contrast, we see that the coefficient on SinSale*QtrEnd loads with a statistically negative
coefficient of 0.0044 (t=-5.34). The coefficient magnitude syggests that sin stocks lose 44 basis
points on the last trading day of the quarter. We also see SinSale*QtrBeg loads with a statistically
significant positive coefficient of 37 basis points (t-stat=3.46).
In Column 2, we split the sin stock variable into its constituent tobacco and firearm
components. We see statistically significant negative coefficients on quarter-end dates and
significant positive coefficients on quarter-beginning dates for both tobacco and firearm
components which is consistent with our hypothesis that reporting requirements trigger sales of
sin stocks. We see that tobacco stocks experience a significant decline on the last trading day of
the quarter of 45 basis points and then experience a significant positive return of 40 basis points
on the first trading day of the quarter. For the same dates, firearm firms experience a decline and
increase of 39 and 27 basis points, respectively.
1.3.2 Evolution of investor preferences over time
Given that our sample runs from 1985 to 2019, it would be worth examining how the return
patterns reported in the previous section change over time. This could help shed light on whether
funds’ preferences to report lower sin stock holdings have changed during our sample period. E.g.,

17

while cigarette consumption today is universally seen as an unhealthy and harmful activity, there
was a period in the 1960s and 70s when smoking was nothing out of the ordinary. Despite the
deleterious effects of cigarette smoking having been established in the medical community in the
1960s, it was only in the late 1980s that the general public started becoming aware of the medical
risks associated with tobacco consumption.4 Public awareness of the risks associated with cigarette
smoking increased considerably in the mid-1990s when more than 40 states commenced litigation
against the tobacco industry. This litigation finally culminated in the 1998 “Master Settlement
Agreement” that found the four largest tobacco companies – Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Brown
& Williamson, and Lorillard – guilty of having downplayed the risks associated with tobacco
consumption. It is, therefore, possible for investors’ preferences, similar to societal views on
tobacco consumption, to have varied with time.
Along the same lines, firearm manufacturers were not considered controversial until the
rise in mass shootings in the early 1990s. Societal views on gun ownership and firearm
manufacturers’ indirect responsibility in facilitating mass shootings began to change after the US
Congress temporarily banned the manufacture and sale of semi-automatic firearms for civilian use
for ten years in 1994. Views surrounding gun ownership became more polarized in the late 1990s
after three high school shootings - Westside Middle School in Arkansas, Thurston High School in
Oregon, and Columbine High School in Colorado occurred in just 12 months of each other. Such
mass shootings were accompanied by prolonged periods of public pressure and boycotts of firearm
stocks (see Appendix A for details). Simultaneously, an equally vociferous pro-gun lobby emerged
that challenged such boycotts. Given how the firearm sector has become the center of political and

4

The chronology of how risks associated with tobacco consumption were disseminated to the public at large has
been chronicled by PBS show “Inside the Tobacco Deal”. The chronology can be found here:
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/timelines/fullindex.html
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social controversy since the late 1990s, it would be worth examining how investors’ preferences
towards firearm stocks have evolved.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
To examine the evolution of investor preferences towards sin stocks, we divide the sample
from 1985 to 2019 into each decade and re-run the regression model specified in equation 1. Table
3 presents the results for each decade. In Column 1, we see that tobacco stocks did not experience
any significant negative return on the last trading day of the quarter in the 1980s. This finding is
not surprising since, as mentioned previously, neither the tobacco nor the firearm sectors were
considered ‘sinful’ during the 1980s. However, by the 1990s, societal norms surrounding tobacco
consumption had begun to change. Column 2 reflects the change in investor preferences, where
we see tobacco stocks experiencing a decline of 104 basis points on the last trading day of the
quarter and an increase of 65 basis points on the first trading day of the quarter. We continue to
observe similar patterns in tobacco stocks’ returns in the 2000s and 2010s, albeit with a smaller
magnitude. The decline on quarter-end dates reduces to 32 basis points in the 2000s and further
drops to 22 basis points in the 2010s.
We also see a similar evolution in investor preferences in firearm stocks. We see that
firearm stocks do not experience any significant negative returns on the last trading day of the
quarter in the 1980s or 1990s, which suggests that ownership of these stocks was not considered
controversial in these decades. However, in the 2000s, firearm stocks experienced a 69 basis point
decline on the last trading day of the quarter. This decline became insignificant in the 2010s,
presumably because, by then, investors realized that no legal or regulatory action would be
forthcoming from the government, as had been against the tobacco companies in the 1990s.
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1.3.3 Prescription based opioid firms’ returns around portfolio disclosure days
Our previous tests suggest that investors’ preferences not to own tobacco and firearm
stocks induce funds to sell these stocks on portfolio reporting days. This section examines whether
another set of firms – those implicated in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of prescriptionbased opioid painkillers – exhibit similar return patterns around disclosure dates. Like tobacco and
firearm firms, firms involved in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of prescription-based
opioid medications took the blame for causing the opioid epidemic that engulfed large parts of the
US in the early 2010s.
While the original intention of prescription-based opioid medications, such as OxyContin,
was to treat chronic pain in hospitalized and recovering cancer patients, the pharmaceutical
industry, led by Purdue Pharma, began promoting such medication for general pain relief in the
early 2000s within the medical community by organizing ‘pain management’ conferences and
conducting sophisticated advertising campaigns (Van Zee, 2009). By 2009, according to the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), prescription opioid overdose deaths had exceeded motor
vehicle deaths and deaths from illegal street drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, and amphetamines.
However, it was only in 2013 that the general US public became aware of the severity of opioid
misuse when the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) imposed civil penalties of $80 million on
Walgreens, a major pharmaceutical retailer, for illegally diverting prescription opioids and failing
to maintain adequate controls over controlled substances. Other pharmaceutical distributors and
retailers such as McKesson, Cardinal Health, and CVS were also accused of similar wrongdoings,
and since then, more than 3400 lawsuits have been filed at the county and state level against
pharmaceutical manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies for failing to highlight the risks
associated with opioid use.
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Given the scale of the opioid abuse, several institutional investors called such firms to take
corrective action (see Appendix A). We identify the nine publicly listed firms charged with
profiting from the opioid crisis and examine whether investors’ preferences effects these firms’
asset prices around quarter-end dates when most mutual funds and institutional investors disclose
their portfolio holdings. Our sample period starts from 2013 because that was when the DEA
charged Walgreens for failing to prevent the abuse of opioid painkillers, thereby revealing the
extent of opioid misuse to the public. Specifically, we run the following regression specification:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽2 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3 . 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽4 . 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽5 . 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(2)

where 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if it has an active opioid-related
lawsuit at the county or state level.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis. In Column 1, we see that the coefficient on
𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 loads with a statistically negative coefficient of 0.003 (t=-2.81). This coefficient

suggests that opioid-related stocks lose three basis points on the last trading day of the quarter. We
also see 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 loads positively with a coefficient of 0.027 (t=2.25). In Column 2, we
limit our attention to the three pharmaceutical wholesalers and distributors charged with failing to
maintain adequate controls for prescription-based opioid medications. We see that these firms
experienced a significant negative return of 2 basis points on the last trading day of the quarter and
a positive return of 3.6 basis points on quarter-start dates. Column 3 limits our attention to the
retail pharmacies charged with illegally supplying opioid medications without valid medical
prescriptions. These firms include Walmart, CVS, Rite Aid, and Walgreens. We see that these
firms experience statistically significant negative returns of 4.8 basis points on the last trading day
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of the quarter. While these firms experience positive returns on the quarter-start dates, the
coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
In Column 4, we limit our attention to the pharmaceutical firms that manufacture opioid
painkillers. We do not see any significant negative (positive) returns on quarter-end (start) dates.
There could be two reasons behind these insignificant results. First, while the number of firms
involved in the manufacture of prescription-based opioid medications, the number of firms that
qualified the sample selection criteria are just two – Johnson & Johnson and Teva Pharmaceuticals
– resulting in a small sample size problem. An alternate reason for the non-result could be that
these firms were involved in the manufacture of other drugs, and the opioid segment of their firms
comprised only a small size of their overall operations, which shielded them from the blame heaped
on other pharmaceutical firms like Purdue Pharma which made the majority of its revenue from
the sale of opioid medication. Finally, in Column 5, we focus on the four firms - McKesson,
Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen, and Johnson & Johnson - that settled with US state attorneys
to pay $26 billion in July 2021. We see that these firms experienced a significant negative
(positive) return of 2.1 (2.9) basis points on the last (first) trading day of the quarter.
1.3.4 Investors’ preferences for highly rated ESG stocks around quarter-end dates
Our previous set of results suggest that the asset price of controversial stocks subject to
investor boycotts experience significant mispricing during funds’ disclosure dates. One potential
explanation for the quarter-end shifts in returns could be that investors, for some personal reasons,
prefer not to hold these sectors, and funds cater to these preferences by selling firms in these sectors
before they disclose their portfolios. In this section we examine the converse, i.e., whether funds’
preference for holding stocks that contribute positive to society leads these first to enjoy positive
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returns on quarter-end days. We ascertain this by examining the return of highly rated ESG
(environmental, social and governance) stocks around quarter-ends.
However, it is worth pausing to consider what preferences investors would have for highly
rated ESG stocks. A long literature stemming from Friedman (1970) argues that the responsibility
of any firm is to increase its shareholder value. Pursuing any other desirable ‘social end’ is
shortsighted, subversive, and ‘harms the foundation of a free society.’ Indeed, Manchiraju and
Rajgopal (2017) find that the introduction of corporate social responsibility mandates in India
adversely affected stock prices and subsequent firm value. Similarly, Krüger (2014) finds that
investors respond negatively to positive CSR news when it is more likely to result from agency
problems. However, recent studies (e.g., Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019) find that at least some
investors derive utility from holding high sustainability stocks and that this demand is driven by
institutional investors (Chen et al., 2020). Thus, we posit that only highly rated ESG stocks with a
high mutual fund or institutional investor presence will experience more mispricing around
quarter-end dates. We run the following regression specification to test the hypothesis:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽2 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3 . 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐸𝑆𝐺)𝑖 + 𝛽4 . 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5 . 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐸𝑆𝐺)𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽6 . 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐸𝑆𝐺)𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽7 . 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑
𝛽8 . 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽9 . 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐸𝑆𝐺)𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10 . 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐸𝑆𝐺) ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽11 . 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐸𝑆𝐺) ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(3)

We start our sample from 2010 because CSR and ESG concerns became financially
prominent only from that period onwards.5 Table 5 presents the results from the analysis. In
Column 1, we run a simple regression without controls for mutual fund, MFOwn, or institutional

5

Our results remain qualitatively similar if we start our sample in 2009 or 2011.
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investor ownership, InstOwn. We see that highly ranked ESG stocks do not experience statistically
significant negative or positive returns around quarter-end or quarter-beginning dates.
In the next column, we introduce the mutual fund ownership measure, MFOwn, and fully
interact it with the quarter-end and quarter-start dates. We observe that while highly rated ESG
stocks with high mutual fund ownership experience significant positive returns (11.7 basis points;
t-stat=3.47), highly rated ESG stocks with low fund ownership experience significant negative
returns. In Column 3, we introduce the institutional ownership measure, InstOwn, and re-run the
analysis. We continue to observe significant positive returns in highly rated ESG stocks with a
high mutual fund presence. We also see that highly rated ESG stocks with high institutional
investor presence experience significant positive returns on quarter-end dates. These findings
confirm our hypothesis that funds and institutional investors, to cater to investor preferences,
increase their holdings of highly-rated ESG stocks around disclosure dates.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
In Columns 4-6, we split the firm’s ESG rating into its constituent environment, social, and
governance components and repeat the analysis carried out in the first three columns. Echoing the
results from Column 1, we see that none of the ESG components load significantly on either
quarter-ends or quarter-start dates. In Column 5, we observe that firms with high environment
(social) ratings and high mutual fund presence experience significant positive returns of 3.6 (8.6)
basis points on quarter-end dates. However, firms widely held by mutual funds with high
governance scores do not experience significant returns on quarter-end dates. Finally, in Column
6, when we control institutional ownership at the firm level, we continue to observe significant
positive returns in firms with high environment scores and social scores with high mutual fund
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ownership on quarter-end dates. We also see that firms with high institutional ownership
experience with high environment and governance scores experience significant positive returns
on quarter-end dates.

1.4. Funds trading behavior in sin stocks around disclosure dates
So far, we have shown that sin (highly rated ESG) stocks experience significant negative
(positive) returns on the last trading day of the quarter and significant positive returns on the first
day of the quarter. While we attribute these return patterns as funds catering to investors’
preferences before disclosing their holdings to their investors, we now focus on the trading patterns
that give rise to this phenomenon. To ascertain whether fund trading activity drives the observed
shift in returns for sin stocks around quarter-ends, we turn to the Ancerno dataset to examine how
fund managers alter their trading activity in sin stocks around these dates. If, as we hypothesize,
fund managers cater to the clientele’s preferences to not invest in sin stocks, we should expect
them to reduce their trading activity in sin stocks before the disclosure and ramp up their trades
after the portfolio disclosure has taken place.
To test for this hypothesis, we construct a measure, ShareSlope, which captures how a fund
alters its future trades in a security in response to its previous trades in that security. For each fund
transaction, we take the ratio of the change in the fund’s position in that security in the four weeks
after the transaction to the change in its position in that security in the four weeks before that
transaction.6 We regress the ShareSlope measure on the indicators for the first and last trading day
of the quarter, percentage sales derived from the sale of sin segments, and their interactions.
Specifically, we run the following regression specification:

6

See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion on the construction and interpretation of the ShareSlope measure.
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𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽2 . 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3 . 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 . 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽5 . 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑔 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(4)

An increase in the trading activity just after the portfolio disclosure, i.e., on the interaction
of SinSale and QtrBeg, would be consistent with our hypothesis that funds withhold from trading
in sin stocks until after the disclosure has taken place. Table 6 presents the results from the analysis.
The regression intercept is 1.34, which suggests that fund managers’ trades, on average, are
positively autocorrelated. We see that the coefficient on QtrEnd (QtrBeg) is significantly negative
(positive) at -0.23 (0.12). These coefficients suggest that relative to non-quarter end dates, funds
reduce (increase) their trading activity in non-sin stocks by 17% (9%) on quarter-end (beginning)
dates. This is consistent with earlier research (e.g., Gormley et al., 2021), which shows that funds
avoid building new positions or exit existing positions just before the disclosure to prevent
disclosing key information to the market. When considering sin stocks, while we do not observe
any significant decline in trading activity compared to their non-sin counterparts, we see a
significant increase in trading activity at the start of the quarter. The ShareSlope for sin stocks
increases by 64% on the first trading day of the quarter, consistent with our hypothesis that funds
delay their regular trades in sin stocks in the month leading up to the disclosure. Funds resume
their trading activity in sin stocks only after their portfolio disclosure, resulting in a spike in the
trading slope.
[Insert Table 6 here]
When we split the SinSale into its firearm and tobacco components (Table 6, Column 2),
we observe that the spike in trading slope is more pronounced in firearm stocks than in tobacco
stocks. Whereas the ShareSlope measure for firearm stocks increases by 135% on the first trading
day of the quarter, the increase for tobacco stocks is 59%. Interestingly, funds start altering their
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trading patterns in firearm stocks on the last trading day of the quarter itself. While this may seem
to run counter to our hypothesis, it should be noted that because the ShareSlope measure uses the
trades 28 days into the future as the numerator, the trades captured when measuring ShareSlope
on QtrEnd take place after the disclosure takes place.
While the results shown in Table 6 show that funds significantly increase their trading
activity in sin stocks after portfolio disclosures, they do not make clear the direction in which funds
trade in sin stocks on quarter-start dates. To examine this, we create an indicator, NetBuyi,s,t, which
equals one when the change in the fund i’s position in the security s in the 28 days before date t is
positive. Similarly, we create a NetSelli,s,t indicator that equals one if the change in fund i’s position
in security s in the 28 days before date t’s trade is negative.7 We then fully interact these indicators
with the dependent variables in Equation 2 (i.e., SinSale, QtrBeg, and QtrEnd) and re-estimate the
regression model. This decomposition of a fund’s past trades allows us to estimate the direction in
which funds increase their trading activity at the turn-of-the-quarter.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Table 7 presents the results from this analysis. We see that while funds do not increase
their purchasing activity of non-sin stocks on quarter-start dates, they significantly increase their
buying activity of sin stocks on quarter-start dates. Specifically, while the ShareSlope for regular
buy trades on non-quarter start/end dates equals 0.91 (1.79-0.88), this increases to 1.60 (1.790.88+0.69) for sin stock purchases on the first trading day of the quarter. In contrast, non-sin stocks
do not experience any significant increase in buying activity on quarter-start dates.

Note that since we drop all observations in which trades in which funds don’t trade even once in the four weeks
proceeding to a trade, NetBuy and NetSell are mirror opposites of each other.
7
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When we decompose SinSale into TobaccoSale and FirearmSale, we see that the increase
in buying activity on quarter-start dates is limited only to tobacco stocks (Table 7, Column 2).
While the coefficient on firearm purchases (QtrBeg×NetBuy×FirearmsSale) is positive, it is not
statistically significant from zero. However, the coefficient on firearm purchases on quarter-end
dates (QtrEnd×NetBuy×FirearmsSale) is significantly positive. As explained previously, while
this may appear to run counter to our hypothesis, this is to be expected given how we construct the
ShareSlope measure. Since all future trades enter into the measure’s numerator, a positive
coefficient on QtrEnd suggests that funds significantly buy more firearm stocks in the 28 days
after their portfolios are disclosed to the general market.

1.5 Conclusion
We find that stocks involved in the sale or manufacture of tobacco, firearms, and opioids
experience significant negative returns on quarter-end dates when most funds and institutional
investors disclose their portfolio holdings. In addition, we find that highly rated ESG stocks with
high mutual fund and institutional investor presence experience significant positive returns on
quarter-ends. We regard this as evidence that funds alter their portfolios to appeal to socially
conscientious investors to cater to investor preferences. To corroborate these findings, we show,
using mutual fund trades, that funds accelerate their trading activity in tobacco and firearm stocks
after their portfolio disclosures.
This study makes three significant contributions to the literature. First, we add to the
literature on how investors’ preferences, through the mutual fund channel, affect asset prices on
disclosure dates. Second, our findings further our understanding of the effect of non-financial
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preferences in capital markets. Finally, our findings contribute to the literature that documents the
effects of mandatory portfolio disclosure on the holdings funds’ actually report.
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Appendix 1.A – Examples of Investor Boycotts and Institutional Pressure on
Sin Stocks and Opioid Stocks
Date and Source

Details

Panel A – Tobacco Stocks
1

24th May 1990 – New Harvard and City University of New York eliminate stocks of tobacco
York Times
companies from their investment portfolios. President Derek Bok of Harvard
University, in a letter dated 18th May disclosed that Harvard had decided on the
divestment in September 1989 and completed the stock sale in March 1990.

2

16th June 2000 – The University of Michigan Board of Regents voted at its June 15-16 meeting
University
of to divest the University of its holdings in tobacco manufacturing companies.
Michigan
Robert Kasdin, U-M executive vice president and chief financial officer, will
instruct the University’s investment managers to sell all relevant stocks within
the next 10 months. In divesting itself of the tobacco-related investments, the UM joins several other institutions—Wayne State, Harvard and Northwestern
universities—and public pension funds in California, Florida, Maryland, Texas
and New York.

3

23 May, 2016 – Axa SA, France’s largest insurer, said it will stop investing in tobacco and divest
Bloomberg
all of its $2 billion dollars of assets in the industry. Axa did not disclose its
rd

tobacco investments. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, its holdings
include stakes in Philip Morris International Inc., British American Tobacco Plc
and Altria Group Inc. “This decision has a cost for us, but the case for divestment
is clear: the human cost of tobacco is tragic; its economic cost is huge,” Deputy
Chief Executive Officer Thomas Buberl, said in the statement. “It makes no
sense for us to continue our investments within the tobacco industry.”
Panel B – Firearm Stocks
4

18th December 2012 – Within hours of Friday’s shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Wall Street Journal
Connecticut, executives at Cerberus Capital Management LP made the call that
Cerberus would put Freedom Group up for sale. Freedom Group is one of the
nation’s biggest makers of guns and ammunition including the Bushmaster rifle
that was used in the shooting at the school.

5

12th April 2013 - In December 2012, following the Sandy Hook Elementary School tragedy in
CalSTRS
Connecticut, CalSTRS board member and California State Treasurer, Bill
Lockyer, issued a call for the fund to divest from companies which manufacture
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firearms and high-capacity magazines that are illegal for sale to, or possession
by, the general public in the state of California. As of December 31, 2012, the
total market value of CalSTRS holdings in Sturm Ruger and Smith & Wesson
was approximately $3 million, which represented 0.3 basis points of the Global
Equity portfolio.
6

15th July, 2016 – New York City Employees’ Retirement System’s board voted to become the
Pensions
& first of the city’s five retirement systems to divest its holdings of some gun
Investments
retailers, said Scott M. Stringer, the fiduciary for the five city pension funds, in
an e-mail.

7

22nd August, 2018 – Yale University’s board of trustees has adopted a policy prohibiting its $27.2
Pensions
& billion endowment from investing in retail outlets that market and sell assault
Investments
weapons. The university announced in a statement on Tuesday that the policy
was adopted by the board following a recommendation by the board’s
Committee on Investor Responsibility.

8

22nd February, 2018 - New Jersey state lawmakers on Thursday moved to restrict the state’s public
CNBC
pensions from investing in the stocks of gun manufacturers. State pensions that
own stocks of gun makers, and to a lesser extent, gun retailers, came under
criticism after the Feb. 14 shooting, in which 17 people died. After the mass
shooting at a concert in Las Vegas last year, California Treasurer John Chiang
urged the state’s teacher and public employee pensions to sell their holdings of
companies that sell assault weapons, ammunition and gun accessories.
Panel C – Opioid Stocks

9

30th October 2017 –
Pensions &
Investments

A coalition of 30 investors representing more than $1.3 trillion in assets is
calling on 10 opioid distributors and manufacturers to examine how they are
responding to business risks related to opioids. “The opioid crisis has already
taken many lives and is a blight on the pharmaceutical industry,” said Denise L.
Nappier, Connecticut treasurer, principal fiduciary of the Hartford-based $34
billion Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, and a member of Investors
for Opioid Accountability, in a news release Monday.

10

13th May 2018 – Shareholders of AmerisourceBergen delivered a strong message to the US’s
Financial Times
third-largest drug distributor in March. Nearly two-thirds of independent voters
supported a resolution calling for information on how the board is addressing
business risks related to the opioid epidemic. “There are four key areas we
currently focus on in healthcare, and of those, the use of opiates is the main one
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right now,” says Andy Mason, responsible investment analyst at fund manager
Aberdeen Standard Investments.
11

19th June 2018 – Attorney General Andy Beshear is urging […] Kentucky Retirement Systems
Kentucky.gov
(KRS) and the Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System (KTRS) […] to stop
investing funds in the six opioid manufactures and distributors that his office is
currently suing over their role in fueling the state’s opioid epidemic. Similar
letters will be sent to other state agencies and quasi-state agencies that have
invested in opioid companies. Beshear wrote based on a March 31, 2018,
monthly report of pension investment holdings, it appears that KRS investments
in the six companies total nearly $38 million. The Kentucky Teachers’
Retirement Systems March 31, 2018, monthly report of pension investment
holdings shows the system owns more than 1 million shares between the six
companies.

12

29th April 2019 – The California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) is taking a role in
Chief
Investment engaging corporate boards and management of opioid manufacturers,
Officer
distributors, and pharmacy retail chains it owns in its $115.5 billion global
equity portfolio, shows a new pension system report. The CalSTRS report said
at the end of 2018, the pension plan, as part of The Opioid Accountability
Coalition, has collaborated with other institutional investors on engagements
with 17 opioid distributors, manufacturers, and retail pharmacy chains, and
achieved reforms with 13 of those companies. Since 2017, the coalition has filed
33 resolutions and reached a settlement with 28 of those companies, the report
said.
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Appendix 1.B – Explaining ShareSlope
In our Ancerno trade tests, we compute the share slope of a trade based on the fund’s date
t trade in security s with the change in the position of that fund in that security over the next four
weeks and past four weeks of that trade. The ShareSlope measure captures how a fund alters its
future trades in a security in response to its previous trading activity. Specifically, it is the ratio of
the change in a fund’s position in a security 28 days after each trade to the change in the fund’s
position in the 28 days before that trade. It should be kept in mind that the ShareSlope measure
cannot differentiate from a fund building its position in a security from a fund divesting its position
from that security. The following two scenarios should make this clearer.
Scenario A – Positive Accumulation
Date

Position

t-28

150

t

120

t+28

100

Scenario B – Positive Divestment

ShareSlope
100 − 120
= +0.66
120 − 150

Date

Position

t-28

100

t

130

t+28

150

ShareSlope
150 − 130
= +0.66
130 − 100

In Scenario A, the fund’s position in security s at date t-28 was 150. The fund then reduces
its position to 120 by date t and 100 by date t+28. Then, as of date t, ShareSlope equals 0.66,
indicating that the fund is exiting from this security but at a slower rate than it had done so in the
past. In Scenario B, the fund starts at an initial position of 100 shares in security s at date t-28. It
then increases its position to 130 by date t and 150 by date t+28. In this scenario, the ShareSlope
measure again equals 0.66, but the fund is now entering the security. In general, the positive slope
measure indicates that the fund has traded in two consecutive buys or two consecutive sells in the
security.
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Analogously, a negative ShareSlope measure suggests that the fund’s future trading
direction is in the opposite direction to its prior four weeks’ trading activity. However, the negative
sign cannot differentiate between funds that are reversing their previous sales from funds that are
reversing their previous buys. Again, consider these two scenarios:
Scenario C – Negative Accumulation
Date

Position

t-28

130

t

100

t+28

120

Scenario D – Negative Divestment

ShareSlope
120 − 100
= −0.66
100 − 130

Date

Position

t-28

70

t

100

t+28

40

ShareSlope
40 − 100
= −2
100 − 70

In Scenario C, the fund’s position at date t-28 stands at 130 shares which reduces to 100
shares by date t and then increases to 120 shares by date t+28. The ShareSlope measure at date t
equals -0.66, which suggests that the fund’s coming four weeks will reverse the previous sale
transactions, but not completely. Finally, Scenario D presents the last possible pattern – the fund
starts at 70 shares, increases its position to 100 shares, and then reduces the position to 40 shares.
In this case, the ShareSlope measure equals -2, which suggests that the fund’s coming four weeks
of trade do not only reverse the past 28 day’s purchases but cancel them out.
Since the ShareSlope measure cannot differentiate between Scenarios A and B (C and D),
we define two indicators NetBuy and NetSell, that take a value of 1 if the fund’s change in the
position in the past 28 trading days is positive and negative respectively. Interacting these
indicators with the ShareSlope variable allows us to differentiate between these two scenarios. We
use these indicators in Tables 6 and7 of our paper. Finally, since small values in the denominator
could result in extremely large values of ShareSlope, we winsorize the measure at the 1% and 99%
levels.

34

Appendix 1.C – Variable definitions
Variable Name
Variable Description
Change-of-quarter-end and beginning indicators
An indicator variable takes the value of one if date t is the last trading day of a
QtrEndt
quarter (i.e., the last trading day of March, June, September, and December).
An indicator variable takes the value of one if date t is the first trading day of
QtrBegt
a quarter (i.e., the first trading day of January, April, July, and October).
An indicator variable takes the value of one if date t is not the first or last
RegularDayt
trading day of a quarter
Stock-level variables
Ret(t)
Return on trade date t.
Sin stock variables
Percentage of sales that a firm derives from the sale of cigarettes, tobacco, and
TobaccoSale
products associated with tobacco use
Percentage of sales that a firm derives from the sale of civilian firearms and
FirearmSale
products associated with civilian firearms
SinSale
Sum of TobaccoSale and FirearmSale
Opioid variables
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has been sued in an opioid
OpioidFirm
epidemic related lawsuit; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is a pharmaceutical
OpioidDistributor
distributor and has been sued in an opioid epidemic related lawsuit; 0
otherwise
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is a pharmaceutical
OpioidPharmacy
retailed and has been sued in an opioid epidemic related lawsuit; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is a pharmaceutical
OpioidManufacturer manufacturer and has been sued in an opioid epidemic related lawsuit; 0
otherwise
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is Johnson & Johnson,
OpioidLawsuit
AmerisourceBergen, McKesson, or Cardinal Health; 0 otherwise
ESG Variables
Rank(ESG)
The monthly percentile rank of the firm’s standardized ESG rating
Rank(Env)
The monthly percentile rank of the firm’s standardized Environmental rating
Rank(Soc)
The monthly percentile rank of the firm’s standardized Social rating
Rank(Gov)
The monthly percentile rank of the firm’s standardized Governance rating
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Fund Ownership Variables
MFOwn
Percentage of the firm’s market capitalization held by mutual funds
InstOwn
Percentage of the firm’s market capitalization held by institutional investors
Fund trade level variables
Ratio of the change in position of a fund i in security sin 28 days after date t to
ShareSlopei,s,t
the change in position 28 days before date t
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the change in position of
NetBuyi,s,t
fund i in security s in the past 28 days before date t is positive.
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the change in position of
NetSelli,s,t
fund i in security s in the past 28 days before date t is negative.
Control variables
agr
Annual percentage change in total assets
bm
Book value of equity divided by fiscal-year-end market capitalization
Estimated market beta from weekly returns and equal-weighted market returns
beta
for three years ending month t-1 with at least 52 weeks of returns
Unexpected quarterly earnings divided by fiscal-quarter-end market cap.
Unexpected earnings equal I/B/E/S actual earnings minus median forecasted
sue
earnings if available, else equals seasonally differenced quarterly earnings
before extraordinary items from Compustat quarterly file.
gma
Revenues minus cost of goods sold divided by lagged total assets
mve
Natural log of market capitation at the end of month t-1
mom12m
11-month cumulative returns ending one month before month-end.
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Figure 1.1 – Average ESG ratings by Year

This figure plots the average standardized ESG score from 2009 to 2019. To arrive at the average yearly ratings,
we first calculate the difference of a firm’s yearly strength score from the yearly weakness score in each rating
category to obtain an overall rating score. We then standardize the score, setting the lowest possible score equal
to 0 and the highest possible score equal to 1. We then take the average of the yearly standardized score in each
category to arrive at the average rating for that given year.
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Table 1.1: Panel A – Distribution of Sin Stocks by Year

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Number of firms
(1)
(2)
Tobacco
Firearms
10
3
9
3
9
3
10
3
10
2
9
4
9
4
10
4
10
3
11
3
11
4
10
4
13
5
10
5
10
5
8
3
7
3
7
4
8
4
9
4
9
4
8
4
8
4
8
4
8
4
7
3
8
3
7
4
7
4
7
4
7
5
6
5
7
5
6
6
6
6

(3)
Sin
13
12
12
13
12
13
13
14
13
14
15
14
18
15
15
11
10
11
12
13
13
12
12
12
12
10
11
11
11
11
12
11
12
12
12

Percentage of Sales
(4)
(5)
Tobacco
Firearms
44%
36%
46%
38%
58%
41%
50%
51%
50%
47%
46%
42%
48%
45%
51%
53%
54%
57%
52%
49%
58%
41%
70%
34%
78%
35%
74%
35%
86%
47%
85%
46%
85%
70%
85%
73%
85%
74%
87%
80%
83%
80%
91%
79%
92%
75%
100%
81%
100%
81%
99%
80%
84%
82%
91%
82%
89%
82%
85%
79%
90%
75%
90%
70%
84%
57%
79%
59%
79%
61%

(6)
Sin
42%
44%
55%
50%
49%
47%
47%
52%
54%
51%
54%
62%
67%
63%
78%
77%
80%
82%
82%
85%
82%
88%
86%
94%
94%
93%
83%
88%
87%
83%
84%
83%
72%
70%
71%

This table tabulates the summary stats of sin stocks. In columns 1-3, we report the year-by-year number of sin stocks
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. In columns 4-6, we report the annual percentage sales derived by these
firms from their sin segments.
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Table 1.1: Panel B – ShareSlope around key portfolio disclosure dates
Tobacco Firearms
0.953
1.964
QtrEnd
1.974
1.673
QtrBeg
1.239
1.480
RegularDay

Sin
1.078
1.937
1.271

Non-sin
1.223
1.396
1.342

The table tabulates the average ShareSlope measure around quarterend dates (i.e., last trading days of March, June, September, and
December), quarter-start dates (i.e., first trading days of January,
April, July, and October) when most funds record their portfolio
positions for future disclosure and non-quarter-end dates (i.e., all
other trading days) for tobacco, firearm, and all other stocks.
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Table 1.2 – Sin stocks’ returns around quarter-ends and beginnings
(1)
Ret(t)
0.0027***
(3.34)
0.0008
(0.90)
-0.0044***
(-5.34)
0.0037***
(-3.46)

QtrEnd
QtrBeg
QtrEnd*SinSale
QtrBeg*SinSale
QtrEnd*TobaccoSale
QtrBeg*TobaccoSale
QtrEnd*FirearmSale
QtrBeg*FirearmSale

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & MonthYear
30059791
0.007

Firm FE
Month-year FE
Asset pricing controls
Clustered S.E
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(2)
Ret(t)
0.0027***
(3.34)
0.0008
(0.90)

-0.0045***
(-5.37)
0.0040***
(3.26)
-0.0039*
(-1.82)
0.0027*
(1.68)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & MonthYear
30059791
0.007

This table reports regressions of daily returns on indicators for dates around the change
in quarters QtrBeg, and QtrEnd, percentage sale derived from tobacco, TobaccoSale,
percentage sale derived from the sale of firearms, FirearmSale, and their interactions. We
also include indicators for changes in months, MosBeg and MosEnd, lower-order controls
(i.e., SinSale, TobaccoSale, and FirearmSale), and other asset pricing controls (see
below), their interactions with QtrBeg, QtrEnd, MosBeg, and MosEnd. However, for
brevity, we do not report the coefficients on these additional controls. Our sample consists
of all firms from 1990-2019 having (i) a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, (ii)
exchange code 10 or 11, and (iii) a market capitalization of greater than 10 million USD.
Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Standard errors are two-way
clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Asset pricing controls: Beta, book-to-market ratio, market value of equity, gross
profitability, 12-month momentum, standardized unexpected earnings and asset growth.
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Table 1.3 – Evolutions of sin stocks’ returns over time

QtrEnd
QtrBeg
QtrEnd*TobaccoSale
QtrBeg*TobaccoSale
QtrEnd*FirearmSale
QtrBeg*FirearmSale
Sample duration
Firm FE
Month-year FE
Asset pricing controls
Clustered S.E
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Ret(t)
Ret(t)
Ret(t)
Ret(t)
0.0048***
0.0031*
0.0014
0.0025**
(5.30)
(1.80)
(1.06)
(2.07)
0.0023
-0.0006
0.0009
0.0010
(1.28)
(-0.45)
(0.59)
(0.45)
-0.0001
-0.0104***
-0.0032*
-0.0022**
(-0.04)
(-4.65)
(-1.69)
(-2.30)
0.0020
0.0065**
0.0044*
0.0014
(0.97)
(1.98)
(1.80)
(1.05)
-0.0036
0.0028
-0.0069***
-0.0022
(-0.52)
(0.87)
(-2.95)
(-0.71)
-0.0082
0.0014
0.0021
0.0048
(-1.20)
(0.39)
(0.78)
(1.13)
1985-90
1991-00
2000-10
2011-19
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Firm &
Firm &
Firm &
Month-Year Month-Year Month-Year Month-Year
4519556
10609716
8560905
6369554
0.011
0.006
0.008
0.009

This table reports regressions of daily returns on indicators for dates around the change in quarters QtrBeg and QtrEnd,
percentage sale derived from the sale of tobacco, TobaccoSale, percentage sale derived from the sale of firearms,
FirearmSale, and their interactions. We also include indicators for changes in months, MosBeg and MosEnd, lowerorder controls (i.e., SinSale, TobaccoSale, and FirearmSale), and other asset pricing controls (see below), their
interactions with QtrBeg, QtrEnd, MosBeg, and MosEnd. However, for brevity, we do not report the coefficients on
these additional controls. Our sample consists of all firms from 1990-2019 having (i) a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ, (ii) exchange code 10 or 11, and (iii) a market capitalization of greater than 10 million USD. Full variable
definitions are provided in Appendix C. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics
are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Asset pricing controls: Beta, book-to-market ratio, market value of equity, gross profitability, 12-month momentum,
standardized unexpected earnings and asset growth.
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Table 1.4 – Opioid stocks’ returns around quarter-ends and beginnings

QtrEnd
QtrBeg
QtrEnd*OpioidFirm
QtrBeg*OpioidFirm

(1)
Ret(t)
0.0017
(1.22)
0.0003
(0.12)
-0.0030***
(-2.81)
0.0027**
(2.25)

(2)
Ret(t)
0.0017
(1.22)
0.0003
(0.12)

(4)
Ret(t)
0.0017
(1.22)
0.0003
(0.12)

(3)
Ret(t)
0.0017
(1.21)
0.0003
(0.12)

-0.0020**
(-1.99)
0.0036**
(2.09)

QtrEnd*OpioidDistributor
QtrBeg*OpioidDistributor

-0.0048**
(-2.30)
0.0019
(1.26)

QtrEnd*OpioidPharmacy
QtrBeg*OpioidPharmacy

-0.0009
(-0.58)
0.0031
(1.52)

QtrEnd*OpioidManufacturer
QtrBeg*OpioidManufacturer
QtrEnd*OpioidLawsuit
QtrBeg*OpioidLawsuit
Firm FE
Month-Year FE
Asset pricing controls
Clustered S.E.
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(5)
Ret(t)
0.0017
(1.22)
0.0003
(0.12)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
5189303
0.009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
5189303
0.009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
5189303
0.009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
5189303
0.009

-0.0021**
(-2.54)
0.0029**
(2.05)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
5189303
0.009

This table reports regressions of daily returns on indicators for dates around the change in quarters, QtrBeg and
QtrEnd, indicators variables that take a value of 1 if the firm was implicated in the US opioid epidemic. We also
include indicators for changes in months, MosBeg and MosEnd, lower-order controls (i.e. OpoidFirm,
OpioidDistributor, etc.), and other asset pricing controls (see below), their interactions with QtrBeg, QtrEnd,
MosBeg, and MosEnd. However, for brevity, we do not report the coefficients on these additional controls. Our
sample consists of all firms from 2013-2019 having (i) a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, (ii) exchange code
10 or 11, and (iii) a market capitalization of greater than 10 million USD. Standard errors are two-way clustered by
security and month-year. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Asset pricing controls: Beta, book-to-market ratio, market value of equity, gross profitability, 12-month momentum,
standardized unexpected earnings, and asset growth.
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Table 1.5 – ESG stock returns around quarter-ends
QtrEnd
QtrBeg
QtrEnd*Rank(ESG)
QtrBeg*Rank(ESG)

(1)
Ret(t)
0.0019
(1.13)
0.0019
(0.72)
-0.0007
(-1.40)
-0.0010
(-1.19)

QtrEnd*Rank(ESG)*MFOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(ESG)*MFOwn

(2)
Ret(t)
0.0010
(0.56)
0.0014
(0.48)
-0.0040***
(-3.47)
-0.0009
(-0.87)
0.0117***
(3.47)
0.0059
(0.43)

QtrEnd*Rank(ESG)*InstOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(ESG)*InstOwn

(3)
Ret(t)
0.0015
(0.80)
0.0008
(0.27)
-0.0050***
(-3.31)
-0.0008
(-0.58)
0.0112***
(3.36)
0.0055
(0.40)
0.0031*
(1.80)
-0.0004
(-0.19)

QtrEnd*Rank(Env)
QtrBeg*Rank(Env)

(4)
Ret(t)
0.0020
(1.13)
0.0021
(0.75)

(5)
Ret(t)
0.0015
(0.72)
0.0013
(0.43)

(6)
Ret(t)
0.0027
(1.21)
0.0007
(0.22)

-0.0001
(-0.22)
-0.0002
(-0.26)

-0.0010
(-1.49)
-0.0001
(-0.14)
0.0036**
(2.02)
0.0033
(0.39)

-0.0004
(-0.82)
-0.0010
(-1.58)

-0.0029***
(-2.94)
-0.0010
(-1.20)
0.0086***
(3.06)
0.0032
(0.29)

-0.0004
(-1.29)
-0.0002
(-0.58)

-0.0010
(-1.25)
0.0003
(0.78)
0.0024
(0.82)
-0.0171**
(-2.08)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
4716928
0.009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
4716928
0.009

-0.0021**
(-2.13)
0.0000
(0.03)
0.0031*
(1.76)
0.0028
(0.33)
0.0031**
(2.18)
-0.0005
(-0.24)
-0.0031**
(-2.57)
-0.0013
(-1.10)
0.0083***
(2.96)
0.0032
(0.29)
0.0009
(0.59)
0.0008
(0.47)
-0.0022**
(-2.15)
0.0006
(0.73)
0.0019
(0.65)
-0.0173**
(-2.11)
0.0036**
(2.29)
-0.0008
(-0.46)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
4716928
0.009

QtrEnd*Rank(Env)*MFOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(Env)*MFOwn
QtrEnd*Rank(Env)*InstOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(Env)*InstOwn
QtrEnd*Rank(Soc)
QtrBeg*Rank(Soc)
QtrEnd*Rank(Soc)*MFOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(Soc)*MFOwn
QtrEnd*Rank(Soc)*InstOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(Soc)*InstOwn
QtrEnd*Rank(Gov)
QtrBeg*Rank(Gov)
QtrEnd*Rank(Gov)*MFOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(Gov)*MFOwn
QtrEnd*Rank(Gov)*InstOwn
QtrBeg*Rank(Gov)*InstOwn
Firm FE
Month-year FE
Asset Pricing Controls
Clustered S.E.
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
4716928
0.009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
4716928
0.009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
4716928
0.009

This table reports regressions of daily returns on indicators for dates around the change in quarters, QtrBeg and QtrEnd, monthly percentile rank of the
firm’s ESG score, Rank(ESG), the percentage of a firm’s market capitalization owned by mutual funds, FundOwn, and their interactions. In Columns 4-6,
we split firm’s ESG rank into its constituent environment rank, Rank(Env), social rank, Rank(Soc), and governance ranks, Rank(Gov). We also include
changes in months, MosBeg and MosEnd, and other asset pricing controls (see below), but we do not report the coefficients on these additional controls for
brevity. Our Sample consists of all firms from 2010-2019 having (i) a listing on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, (ii) exchange code 10 or 11, and (iii) a
market capitalization of greater than 10 million USD. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Asset pricing controls: Beta, book-to-market ratio, market value of equity, gross profitability, 12-month momentum, standardized unexpected earnings,
and asset growth.

43

Table 1.6 – Funds trading activity around quarter-ends and
beginnings
(1)
ShareSlope
-0.2323***
(-3.25)
0.1209***
(3.00)
-0.1857
(-0.76)
0.7408**
(2.48)

QtrEnd
QtrBeg
QtrEnd*SinSale
QtrBeg*Sinsale
QtrEnd*TobaccoSale
QtrBeg*TobaccoSale
QtrEnd*FirearmSale
QtrBeg*FirearmSale

1.3416***
(1037.02)
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
39882373
0.014

Intercept
Fund FE
Security-by-month FE
Two-way clustered SE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(2)
ShareSlope
-0.2324***
(-3.25)
0.1209***
(3.00)

-0.3221
(-1.14)
0.6713**
(2.05)
1.5864**
(2.11)
1.6914*
(1.83)
1.3416***
(1037.04)
Yes
Yes
Firm &
Month-Year
39882373
0.014

This table reports regressions of ShareSlope on the interactions between indicators for dates
around the change in quarters, QtrEnd and QtrBeg, percentage sale derived from the sale of
tobacco, TobaccoSale, percentage sale derived from the sale of firearms, FirearmSale, and their
interactions. We estimate this regression using all transactions marked by Ancerno as ‘good trades’
over the period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades from client managers that do not execute at
least one trade in both the prior and subsequent month. Full variable definitions are provided in
Appendix C. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.7 – Funds trading direction around quarter-ends
NetBuy
QtrEnd*NetBuy
QtrEnd*NetSell
QtrBeg*NetBuy
QtrBeg*NetSell
QtrEnd*NetBuy*SinSale
QtrEnd*NetSell*SinSale
QtrBeg*NetBuy*SinSale
QtrBeg*NetSell*SinSale

(1)
ShareSlope

(2)
ShareSlope

-0.8842***
(-32.68)
-0.2008**
(-2.22)
-0.2457***
(-3.19)
0.0604
(1.47)
0.1531**
(2.45)
0.2816
(1.19)
-0.6454
(-1.27)
0.6985***
(2.80)
0.7818
(1.10)

-0.8841***
(-32.68)
-0.2009**
(-2.22)
-0.2457***
(-3.19)
0.0604
(1.47)
0.1531**
(2.45)

QtrEnd*NetBuy*TobaccoSale
QtrEnd*NetSell*TobaccoSale
QtrBeg*NetBuy*TobaccoSale
QtrBeg*NetSell*TobaccoSale
QtrEnd*NetBuy*FirearmSale
QtrEnd*NetSell*FirearmSale
QtrBeg*NetBuy*FirearmSale
QtrBeg*NetSell*FirearmSale
1.7961***
(126.69)
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month-Year
39882373
0.015

Intercept
Fund FE
Security-by-month FE
Two-way clustered SE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

0.0195
(0.07)
-0.6457
(-1.22)
0.6221**
(2.38)
0.7190
(0.95)
3.1482***
(2.70)
-0.6422
(-0.77)
1.5431
(1.11)
1.8500
(1.52)
1.7961***
(126.73)
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month-Year
39882373
0.015

This table reports regressions of ShareSlope on the interactions between indicators for dates around the change in quarters,
QtrEnd and QtrBeg, percentage sale derived from the sale of tobacco, TobaccoSale, percentage sale derived from the sale
of firearms, FirearmSale, and indicators for whether the net trades in the prior one month of trade were buys, NetBuy or
sells, NetSell, and their interactions. We estimate this regression using all transactions marked by Ancerno as ‘good trades’
over the period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades from client managers that do not execute at least one trade in both the
prior and subsequent month. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Standard errors are two-way clustered by
security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 2
More informative disclosures, less informative
prices? Portfolio and price formation around
quarter-ends
2.1 Introduction
Because portfolio disclosures convey information incremental to fund returns, they play a vital role in
allocating capital. Asset managers scrutinize the specific stocks mutual funds hold when making
allocation decisions, and fund flows respond to media coverage and assessments of reported positions
(e.g., Solomon et al., 2014; Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019). Disclosures can also be combined with
information about fund benchmarks and realized returns to predict future fund performance, providing
further justification for scrutinizing disclosed positions (e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2008; Sensoy, 2009;
Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Cremers and Pareek, 2016). This scrutiny is likely to affect fund
managers’ trading decisions, and in turn, price formation. Consistent with this possibility, practitioners
argue that disclosures affect funds’ allocation choices in the days before they record holdings (e.g.,
Durden, 2018), and the timing of these disclosures, which primarily occur on a quarterly basis,
coincides with what Jim Cramer of CNBC referred to as the “quarter-end phenomenon,” a perception
that prices are less informative around quarter-ends. In this paper, we analyze whether portfolio
formation and, ultimately, price discovery do in fact change around when most funds make disclosures.
To analyze whether portfolio formation varies with the reporting cycle, we use Abel-Noser’s
fund-level trading data (Ancerno) to create a novel classification of every trade based on its association
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with prior and future trades of the fund. Using a four-week window around each trade, we classify
trades into one of four categories: initiating, building, completing, and one-off. “Initiating” trades do
not resemble prior trades within the window but do predict future trades [e.g., a fund makes an initial
purchase (sale) of a particular stock and continues to be a net purchaser (seller) over the next four
weeks], while “completing” trades are predicted by past trades but do not resemble future trades [e.g.,
a purchase (sale) was preceded by earlier purchases (sales) of the same stock but no additional net
purchases (sales) over the next four weeks]. Trades that “build” a position are both preceded and
followed by similar trades, while “one-off” trades are neither preceded nor followed by similar trades.
We then analyze whether the distribution of trade types shift around the most common dates that funds
record positions for disclosure. In particular, because funds record positions for voluntary and
mandatory disclosures on month-end days, with most of these occurring on quarter-ends, we focus on
trading dynamics around these dates.
Using our trade classification system, we show that funds construct positions on a quarter-byquarter basis, consistent with disclosures affecting portfolio formation. First, relative to other days,
funds are 13.6% less likely to initiate new positions on the last day of a quarter (i.e., the day when most
position recordings occur) but 7.4% more likely to initiate new positions the first day of the quarter.
The opposite pattern occurs for trades that complete positions. The cyclical pattern around quarterends also extends to one-off and building trades. Specifically, we find more one-off trades around
quarter-ends, both before and after the quarter-end, while finding the opposite for building trades. For
example, a trade is 40.1% (14.2%) more likely to be a one-off trade on quarter-end (quarter-start) days.
We observe similar, but attenuated, dynamics around other month-end days when fewer funds report
positions.
We next analyze the potential disclosure-related motives for these trade dynamics. One
possibility is that funds are timing their trades to exert price pressure and inflate net asset values before
recording positions (e.g., Carhart et al., 2002; Hu et al., 2013). A second possibility is that fund
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managers are putting less weight on maximizing expected returns when making pre-disclosure trades
and putting more weight on the specific positions they wish investors to see (e.g., Haugen and
Lakonishok, 1988; Musto, 1997, 1999). For example, funds might rebalance or accelerate the
completion of trading campaigns to make their reported holdings more reflective of their planned
allocation. Funds might also conceal positions by temporarily trading out of them or by delaying
intended positions they need more time to build or do not want to disclose.
Portfolio-pumping trades do not appear to drive these quarterly dynamics. Although buy trades
increase relative to sell trades on quarter-end days (e.g., Hu et al. 2013), this dynamic is not
concentrated in certain trade types, as would be predicted by portfolio pumping. Instead, the quarterend dynamics we document are driven by both buy and sell trades for each trade type. We also find
no evidence that the quarter-end increases in completing and one-off purchases are concentrated among
a fund’s larger holdings, where the mark-to-market motive would be greatest.
The quarterly trade dynamics instead appear to reflect an attempt by funds to manage the
information they disclose to potential investors. On the one hand, funds appear to execute trades
designed to make their quarterly disclosures more informative of planned future holdings. In particular,
funds accelerate the completion of existing positions and execute more one-off trades that rebalance
positions back to desired levels. At the same time, funds also appear to decrease the informativeness
of their disclosures by not initiating new positions until the start of the next quarter. This delay appears
driven by a desire to create more time to get the trades done before disclosing them. Consistent with
this motive, the delay in initiating trades is larger among illiquid and small-cap stocks, for which funds
might want to build a position slowly to avoid exerting price pressure, and trading campaigns begun
on the first day of the quarter are larger in size and spread across more trades. Funds likely less able to
manage illiquidity, smaller funds and funds that trade less frequently, are also more likely to delay
trading campaigns until the next quarter.
On net, the observed quarterly trade dynamics appear to increase the overall informativeness of
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disclosures. Specifically, we find that quarter-end portfolios do a better job of predicting funds’ future
positions than portfolios on other days. Thus, while the delay in initiating new positions would tend to
decrease the informativeness of disclosures, the increased informativeness caused by accelerating
planned positions appears to more than offset this impact.
We next examine whether the quarterly trade dynamics we document are associated with
changes in price formation. Because funds earn the bulk of their excess returns when initiating and
building long-term positions (e.g., Di Mascio et al., 2017; Chakrabarty et al., 2017), the quarter-end
decline in such trades could reduce price discovery. More generally, if quarterly disclosures cause fund
managers to execute trades for reasons unrelated to new information or intrinsic values, the resulting
trades could reduce price informativeness on quarter-end days.
Consistent with funds executing quarter-end trades for disclosure- rather than informationbased motives, we find that price informativeness declines at quarter-ends. Specifically, returns on
quarter-end days explain less of the variation in longer-term price changes than returns on other days.
The magnitude of the decline is economically significant. Relative to other days, returns on the last
day of the quarter are 32% less informative about 30-day returns. This decline in price informativeness
is present (though smaller in magnitude) in other days leading up to the quarter-end and present for
each of the four quarter-ends. There is little evidence of a change in the relative informativeness of
daily returns on the first day of the quarter or around other month-ends.
Finally, we analyze commissions. Because brokers provide access to information (Green et al.,
2014) and funds compensate brokerages using commissions (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2009), a quarter-end
drop in commissions would also be indicative of funds trading on less new information around quarterends. Consistent with this possibility, we find that the commissions paid by funds decline around
quarter-ends, and a drop in commissions paid within a given fund-broker pair drives this decline. There
is no evidence of funds shifting to lower fee brokerages at quarter-end. The total commissions paid by
3

a fund over the year are also smaller when a larger proportion of the trades executed with that broker
occur on quarter-end dates.
This paper makes two key contributions. First, our evidence expands our knowledge of how
disclosure affects fund trading decisions. The prior literature investigates whether disclosures induce
funds to execute trades designed to deceive investors or conceal investment strategies, which will tend
to make disclosures less informative.8 In contrast, we document that disclosures lead funds also to
adjust the timing of trading campaigns. In particular, funds delay initiating new positions until after
quarter-end and accelerate the completion of existing positions before quarter-end. Moreover, while
the delayed trades conceal fund managers’ intentions, the trades that fund managers accelerate and
execute at quarter-end tend to make subsequent disclosures more (not less) informative about positions
the fund will hold going forward.
The second contribution is related to the literature on the information externalities of
disclosures. Many studies implicitly assume these externalities are positive because the information
has an ameliorative effect on market functioning (e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). For example,
reporting requirements can discipline managers into doing research and executing trades that accelerate
information into the price. If true, we would expect price changes on quarter ends to exhibit momentum
as subsequent investors trade in the same direction as the informed trades induced by disclosure
(Campbell et al., 1993). However, others argue that disclosures can distort prices (e.g., Haugen and
Lakonishok, 1988; Musto, 1997, 1999).9 We find evidence of the latter. Quarter-ends, when most funds
record positions, are associated with less informative prices and subsequent return reversals, and these

Such “window-dressing” strategies analyzed by the prior literature include: (i) concealing risk (e.g., Musto, 1997 and
1999), (ii) buying winners and selling losers (e.g., Haugen and Lakonishok, 1988; Lakonishok et al., 1991; Meier and
Schaumburg, 2004; Agarwal et al., 2014), (iii) concealing fund strategy (e.g., Wermers, 2011), and (iv) reporting high
dividend yield (e.g., Hartzmark and Solomon, 2013; Harris et al., 2015).
9
Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) argue that the “January effect,” where stock returns tend to surge in early January, might
be driven by institutions’ attempt to make their annual disclosures appear stronger by selling small stocks at year-end or by
not buying such stocks until the new year begins. Similarly, Musto (1997; 1999) provides evidence that such windowdressing motives also affect year-end commercial paper prices.
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price dynamics appear partly driven by how funds’ adjust portfolios for quarter-end disclosures. These
findings indicate that, on net, providing information about fund holdings tends to distort secondary
market prices around quarter-ends.

2.2 Potential impact of disclosures on trading and prices
Investors receive information about fund portfolios through both mandatory SEC filings and
voluntary disclosures to large data vendors. Institutional investors are subject to mandatory ownership
disclosure requirements by the SEC – Form 13F and Forms N-CSR and N-Q (these latter two forms
replaced Form N-30D in May 2004). While both disclosures are filed quarterly, Form 13-F filings are
aggregated at an institution level and reported on quarter-end days of the calendar year while Forms
N-CSR and N-Q are filed at the individual fund level and reported on quarter-end days of the fund’s
fiscal year (which frequently coincides with the calendar year). In addition, mutual funds often provide
voluntary, fund-level disclosures to major data vendors, like CRSP, Morningstar, and Thomson
Reuters, and for convenience reasons, these voluntary disclosures typically coincide with quarter-end
days of the calendar year when institutions are already having to file their Form 13F (Schwarz and
Potter, 2016).
The importance of quarter- and month-end dates for disclosures is shown in Table 1, which
tabulates the frequency of reported holdings by date across two databases commonly used by investors.
In the Thomson-Reuters S-12 dataset, which includes a mixture of mandatory and voluntary
disclosures, the vast majority of disclosed holdings occur on quarter-end days of the calendar year (i.e.,
the last day of March, June, September and December). By dollar value, 80.9% of reported holdings
were recorded on these dates, and almost all of the remaining holdings are recorded on other monthend days (19.1%) (Table 1, Column 1). Prior to 2008, the pattern is similar for recorded holdings
reported through the CRSP Mutual Fund Database (Column 2), but the number of other month-end
recordings in CRSP is slightly higher in more recent years (Column 3). In 2008, CRSP migrated to
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using data from Lipper instead of Morningstar, and this seems to have resulted in an increase in its
proportion of SEC-mandated disclosures, which are more likely made on other month-end days
(Schwarz and Potter, 2016). However, even in these later years, roughly half of all disclosures occur
on quarter-ends, meaning CRSP fund holdings are still twice as likely to be recorded on a quarter-end
than on other month-ends.
These disclosures (whether they be voluntary or mandated) are important as they are scrutinized
by asset managers and can influence investor allocations. For example, wealth advisory firms like JP
Morgan, Edward Jones, and Wells Fargo Advisors, typically employ a team of analysts to review these
portfolio disclosures and make recommendations that impact the funds their organizations invest
clients’ money in. These fund analysts use reported holdings to assess whether the funds’ holdings are
consistent with its stated strategy, to assess the riskiness of the portfolio, and to question fund managers
about their investment strategy and comparative advantage. Consistent with reported portfolio holdings
affecting assets under management, Solomon et al. (2014) show that positions that attract media
attention tend to generate flows. Relatedly, Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) show that the Morningstar
ESG rankings of funds, which are a function of reported holdings, also affect fund flows.
The intense scrutiny of these disclosures might in turn affect portfolio allocation through a
number of channels. Funds might engage in portfolio-pumping trades to inflate reported returns
(Carhart et al., 2002; Hu et al., 2013). Funds might also engage in trades designed to manage the
information being disclosed to investors (Haugen and Lakonishok, 1988). For example, numerous
practitioner-focused articles argue that funds make window-dressing trades (e.g., Kansas, 2011) to
conceal past or future positions of the fund. On the other hand, funds might rebalance their portfolios
before revealing them to investors to achieve their preferred mix of assets (e.g., D’Allegro, 2016;
Durden, 2018), thus making disclosures more informative of future positions.
It is also possible that disclosures cause firms to shift the timing of trading campaigns and the
type of information they trade upon so as to avoid disclosing incomplete positions. For example, funds
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might delay initiating trading campaigns based on new information so as to avoid disclosing a position
that is not yet fully built and that they are not yet ready to discuss with potential investors. This desire
to delay could be particularly salient for new positions where the fund seeks to build a larger position
or do so over a longer time period. Funds might also be more likely to complete trading campaigns
that were previously started based on past information so as to use the next disclosure to market these
positions and provide investors with a better sense of the weighting each stock will receive in the
portfolio moving forward.
The evaluation process of major fund customers, including Edward Jones and JP Morgan, could
also affect fund managers’ disclosure-motivated trading incentives. These large fund customers often
conduct automated ‘attribution’ tests on disclosed portfolios to assess the proportion of abnormal
performance that is explained by individual positions and to flag performance that cannot be explained
by disclosed positions. Avoiding unexplained performance, which often leads to a follow-up call with
a wealth manager, provides motivation for fund managers to make reported positions informative about
their funds’ holdings.
How these potential shifts in portfolio formation around quarterly disclosures affect price
efficiency will depend on their connection to intrinsic value. If disclosures cause fund managers to
trade for reasons unrelated to intrinsic value (e.g., to engage in portfolio pumping, to manage the
information being disclosed, or to avoid reporting incomplete positions), the trades could induce price
movements that do not reflect intrinsic values and are less informative of the future price.
Alternatively, if disclosure induces investors to adopt positions that better reflect their information
about intrinsic values, the resulting price movement would be more informative of longer-term price
movements as the trades push price towards its intrinsic value.
Because it is ex-ante unclear how fund managers portfolio formation strategies will react to
disclosure requirements or how this potential shift might affect price efficiency, it is necessary to test
for their impact. We now turn to discussing our empirical strategy.
7

2.3 Data and variable definitions
Our independent variables of interest are four indicator variables that flag key dates around when
most funds record their holdings for subsequent disclosures. The first indicator, Qtr_End, captures the
last trading day of each calendar-year quarter (i.e., last trading day of March, June, September, and
December), and the second indicator, Month_End, captures the end of all other months. Collectively,
these two indicators capture the dates on which nearly all funds record their holdings (see Table 1).
We then construct two similar indicators to capture the first trading day after when most positions are
recorded. Specifically, we define Qtr_Beg as the first trading day of each calendar-year quarter (i.e.,
first trading day of January, April, July, and October) and Month_Beg as an indicator for the first
trading day of all other months.
To assess whether trading dynamics differ around these dates, we use the Ancerno proprietary
dataset from Abel Noser Solutions, a financial services firm that provides trading cost analytics advice
to institutional asset owners, managers, and brokers, such as mutual funds and pension funds. The
Ancerno dataset allows us to observe trade-level data from institutions that subscribe to Abel Noser’s
services, which covers about 12 percent of CRSP trading volume (Hu et al., 2018). The data includes
the date of fund managers’ transactions, the stock symbol of the trade, the number and value of shares
traded, and any commissions paid. While the dataset anonymizes the name of the trading fund manager,
identification codes for managers are provided, which allows us to track each fund’s trades across
stocks and over time. For our analysis, we include all transactions marked by Ancerno as ‘good trades’
(i.e., trades that were actually executed) over the period 1998 – 2010, which reflect the earliest year of
the Ancerno data and the latest year made available to us. We further require that the client manager
execute at least one trade in both the prior and subsequent month, to ensure our findings are unaffected

8

by a subscription lapse.10
We classify each trade by its association with the sign of both past and future trades executed by
the same fund. To do this, we begin by summing across trades to create a fund-security-date measure
of shares transacted. We then take the sign of these trades (Sign(Volt)) and delete the small number of
cases for which sells and buys net out to zero (~0.2% of the sample). At the fund-security level, we
then aggregate trades over the previous and subsequent four weeks and calculate the sign of both the
past and future volume, Sign(Volprevious) and Sign(Volsubsequent).
We categorize all day t trades into the four categories, Building, Initiating, Completing, and Oneoff, based on the association between the sign of the trade on day t and the sign of past and future trades.
Specifically, we define Building trades as those for which day t volume has the same sign as both the
past and future volume of trades in that stock by that fund. Consistent with funds building positions
gradually (e.g., Di Mascio et al., 2017; Chakrabary et al., 2017), this is the most common trade type
(44.2% of trades).

We define Initiating trades as day t trades that predict the sign of future trade

volume but is not predicted by the sign of past trade volume (e.g., the fund is a net seller of the stock
on day t and over the next four weeks but was not a net seller of the shares in the prior four weeks).
This is the least common type of trade (17.6% of trades). We define Completing trades as those for
which the sign of past trade predicts day t trade, but day t trade does not predict the sign of future trade
(e.g., the fund was a net buyer in the prior four weeks and on day t, but not in the subsequent four
weeks). Finally, we classify One-off trades as those for which day t trade is neither predicted by past
volume nor predicts future volume. Our subsequent findings are robust to using either a shorter or
longer trading window to classify each trade; in particular, the paper’s findings are similar when using

Because fund names are anonymized in Ancerno, we are not able to ascertain when each fund’s fiscal year ends, which
prevents us from determining when each fund records positions for its mandatory SEC disclosures. Moreover, because
asset managers often demand information on a fund’s holdings when they are considering a change in asset allocation,
many funds provide voluntary disclosures of their holdings to large data vendors on month- and quarter-ends that do not
coincide with the funds’ fiscal quarter. Therefore, trades around these times can be disclosure-motivated even if the
disclosure is not made to the SEC.
10
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one-, two-, or six-week windows. A breakdown of the trades and their frequency in our data is given
below:
Classification of day t trades
Predicts future trade

Predicted by prior trade

Not predicted by prior trade

Sign(Volt)=Sign(Volprevious)

Sign(Volt)≠Sign(Volprevious)

Building (44.2%)

Initiating (17.6%)

Completing (18.0%)

One-off (20.2%)

Sign(Volt)=Sign(Volsubsequent)

Does not predict future trade
Sign(Volt)≠Sign(Volsubsequent)

There are considerable differences in the average characteristics of the different trade types. Table
2, where we provide descriptive statistics for the characteristics of each trade type, illustrates these
differences. For example, One-off trades are more likely to be sales while Building and Completing
trades are more likely to be purchases. Among the four trade types, One-off trades tend to have the
smallest volume, while Building trades tend to have the largest.
We also construct an additional measure of trade, the commissions paid per share
(CommissionsPerShare). Commissions are often used to compensate brokerages for information from
both the brokerage and management companies (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2009). To compute commissions
per share, we sum commissions over all trades at the fund-security-date level and divide by the number
of shares traded. We winsorize CommissionsPerShare at zero and ten cents to constrain ourselves to
commissions commonly paid by funds (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2009; Anand et al., 2011). In our sample,
the average commission is about two cents per share.
To assess whether pricing dynamics differ around common disclosure days or when the types
of trades being executed in a stock differ, we calculate stock returns by obtaining the security prices
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and limiting the sample to common
shares (i.e., share code 10 or 11) that trade on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with a prior month-end
market capitalization larger than ten million dollars. We provide a full description of these variables,
along with all other variables, in Appendix A.
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2.4 Fund trading patterns around quarter- and month-ends
In this section, we first analyze whether trading dynamics are different around the days in
which most funds record positions for subsequent disclosures. We then analyze the potential
disclosure-related explanations for any observed shifts in trading dynamics.

2.4.1 Frequency of trade types around quarter- and month-ends
To test for whether reporting cycles are associated with shifts in trade dynamics, we begin by
estimating a simple linear regression to understand how the frequency of each trade type changes
around the end of the quarter, the most common date on which funds record and disclose positions.
Specifically, we regress our four trade-type indicators, which are unique at the fund-security-date level,
on indicators for whether the date coincides with one of the last five (i.e., [t – 4, t]) or first five trading
days (i.e., [t + 1, t + 5]) of a quarter. Specifically, we estimate
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑5𝑛=−4 𝛾𝑛 𝑄𝑇𝑅_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , (1)
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 is one of our four trade-type classifications measured at the fund level i, for
security s, on date t, and Qtr_Endt-n are indicators for days around the quarter-end. Specifically,
Qtr_Endt-3 indicates three trading days before the end of the quarter, Qtr_Endt indicates the last trading
day of the quarter, and Qtr_Endt+3 indicates three trading days after the quarter end.

To be

conservative, we cluster the standard errors at both the security and month-year levels.11
The coefficient estimates on our indicators equals the difference in trade-type frequency
between days around the quarter-end and the intercept, 𝛼, which equals the trade-type frequency for
trades not within five trading days of a quarter-end. For example, because 15.2% of trades on the last

11

We use two-way clustering at the security and month-year levels as this yields the most conservative t-statistics. The tstatistics are higher if we instead cluster at the security and day levels or if we do not cluster at all.
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day of the quarter (i.e., t) are Initiating trades and 17.6% of trades not around the quarter-end are
Initiating trades, the regression coefficient we plot in the graph, -2.4 percentage points, represents the
abnormal frequency of Initiating trades on that day.
We find strong evidence of a shift in the likelihood that funds initiate new positions around
quarter-ends. This is seen in Panel A of Figure 1. Funds initiate positions with below average frequency
on the last day of the calendar quarter (-2.4 percentage points) and above average frequency on the day
after the quarter-end (1.3 percentage points). Each of these differences are statistically significant at
conventional levels, as indicated by the t-stats reported in parenthesis next to each point estimate.
Because 17.6% of trades in our sample are classified as Initiating, the day t difference indicates that
funds are 2.4/17.6 = 13.6% less likely to initiate positions on quarter-ends relative to an average trading
day, and 1.3/17.6 = 7.4% more likely to initiate positions on the first trading day of the quarter. While
the quarter-end decrease in Initiating trades is concentrated at the last day of the quarter, the increase
in Initiating trades persists for four days after the quarter-end, with an abnormal frequency of about 1.0
percentage points each day.
For Completing trades, we observe the inverse dynamic, as seen in Figure 1, Panel B.
Completing trades are 1.6 percentage points more likely the day before the quarter-end and 0.9
percentage points less likely on the post-quarter-end day. Funds also complete positions with above
average frequency the day prior to the calendar quarter-end, but the increase is only marginally
significant (t-stat = 1.88). There is also suggestive evidence that funds complete positions with below
average frequency on each of the four trading days following the post-quarter-end day, but none of
these differences are significantly different from zero.
The trading dynamics for One-off trades and Building trades are also different around quarter
ends, but unlike Initiating and Completing trades, these trade types show similar shifts both before and
after the quarter-end. Specifically, funds are more likely to execute One-off trades at both the end and
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start of the quarter, with the effects being particularly pronounced on the last trading day of the quarter
(Figure 1, Panel C). Trades are 8.0 and 2.8 percentage points more likely to be a One-off trade on the
last and first trading day of quarters, respectively, which corresponds to increases of 40.1% and 14.2%
relative to all other days. Building trades, however, exhibit the inverse pattern by declining in frequency
both before and after the quarter end, with the biggest decrease of 7.2 percentage points occurring on
the quarter-end day (Panel D).12

2.4.2 Regression analysis of trade types around quarter- and month-ends
The univariate patterns in trades around quarter ends suggest that funds construct portfolios on
a quarter-by-quarter basis by completing existing positions before the quarter-end and initiating new
positions afterward. In this section, we construct multivariate tests to examine whether these univariate
trading patterns might instead be explained by differences in the type of securities traded, transaction
characteristics, or the types of funds that choose to transact on these days. In addition to using our
multivariate analysis to examine trade-type frequencies around quarter-ends, we also examine tradetype frequencies around other month-ends, another frequent reporting day.
We test whether these shifts in trading dynamics are robust to controlling for various fund,
stock, and trade characteristics around quarter- and month-ends by estimating
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑠 × 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝐸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , (2)
where Qtr_End, Qtr_Beg, Month_End, and Month_Beg are indicators to flag the last and first trading
days of the quarter and other months. To account for the potential confounding effect of fund
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Motivated by Lakonishok et al. (1991), who present evidence that year-end portfolio holdings are scrutinized more
intensively, we also investigate whether trading dynamics differ between year-ends and other quarter-ends. In untabulated
analysis, we find that the observed quarterly trade dynamics occur around both types of quarter-ends. However, the
observed shift for Initiating trades is larger at year-end, consistent with funds’ managing the flow of information about new
trading campaigns more at year-end (Haugen and Lakonishok, 1988).
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redemptions, which are more frequent around quarter-ends, we include two controls for orderimbalances at the fund-level and their interactions with our four turn-of-the-month indicators, 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 .13
To ensure our results are not driven by prices, trade sizes and signs, and the volume of trade, we include
a bevy of controls for these trade characteristics.14 We include fund fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 to control for fixed
differences in funds’ trading patterns and security-by-month-year fixed effects, 𝛿𝑠 × 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝐸, to
control for time-varying differences in security characteristics (such as liquidity). We continue to
cluster our standard errors two ways, on security and month-year.
The shift in trading dynamics around quarter-ends is not driven by a shift in other trade or stock
characteristics or their importance around these particular dates. This is shown in Table 3. Even with
the additional controls, we still find that funds execute Initiating trades less frequently before quarterends and more frequently after them (Table 3, Column 1), and the opposite is true for Completing trades
(Column 2). Moreover, we continue to see an increase in One-off trades (Column 3) and a decrease in
Building trades (Column 4). The coefficient magnitudes are also comparable to those presented in our
univariate plots. For example, Qtr_End loads with a coefficient of -2.5 percentage points in the
estimation (Column 1), similar to the -2.4 percentage-point difference for quarter-end days reported in
Figure 1. We find similar patterns, though less prominent, around other month-end days, as seen by
comparing the coefficients on Month_End and Month_Beg to those found for Qtr_End and Qtr_Beg.
The attenuated pattern around other month ends is consistent with fewer firms recording positions on
those days (see Table 1).

13

Specifically, we include an indicator for whether the fund has net outflows on that date and the signed log of the dollar
value of fund flows for that date. We also include interactions between each of these two variables and our four turn-ofmonth indicators.
14
We include the following trade-level controls: sign of trade (i.e., buy or sell), shares traded, signed log of number of
shares traded, absolute value of log of number of shares traded, dollar volume of trade, signed log of dollar volume of trade,
absolute value of log dollar volume, price, price squared, and price logged.
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2.4.3 Interpretation
The shift in trading dynamics documented in Figure 1 and Table 3 is consistent with funds
adjusting their trading strategies in response to the quarterly reporting cycle. For example, some of the
dynamics, including the spike in One-off trades, might be driven by a desire to deceive investors. Such
shifts in trade dynamics could reduce the informativeness of disclosures. On the other hand, the
increase (decrease) in Completing trades prior to (after) the quarter’s end could be driven by funds
seeking to finish existing trading campaigns so that reported holdings are reflective of the positions the
funds plan to hold and market in subsequent sales-related discussions. Such shifts, if present, would
tend to increase the informativeness of fund disclosures. And the decrease (increase) in Initiating
positions prior to (after) the quarter’s end could be driven by funds’ desire to avoid trading on new
information the fund is not yet ready to discuss with investors.
We next analyze these and other possible motives for why funds might undertake different
trades around quarter- and month-ends, and how these trade dynamics affect disclosure
informativeness. In particular, we analyze the potential role of portfolio pumping and funds’ incentives
to manage the information released in their disclosures. We also analyze whether funds are delaying
some trades to avoid having a disclosure interfere with the building of a new position.

2.4.3.1 Portfolio pumping?
One potential explanation for the quarter-end shifts in portfolio formation is that funds are
timing their trades because of concerns regarding the quarter-end marking of their positions (e.g.,
Carhart et al., 2002). For example, a fund manager might execute buy trades at quarter-end because the
resulting price pressure increases the quarter-end valuation of an existing position, not because a larger
position is otherwise warranted. And by extension, the manager might delay selling some of a position
at quarter-end – though would not avoid selling all of it – because the resulting price pressure decreases
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the marked valuation of the remaining position. Consistent with such motives, Hu et al. (2013) find
the percentage of buy trades increases on quarter-ends, and we find a similar pattern in our data. If
these increased buys and decreased sales are concentrated in different trade types, then portfolio
pumping might explain the observed quarter-end trade dynamic. Specifically, for trade types that
increase in frequency at quarter-end (i.e., Completing and One-off), we would expect buy trades, not
sales, to drive this change. And for trade types that decrease in frequency (i.e., Building and Initiating),
we would expect reduced sales, not reduced buys.15
To assess this possibility, we examine whether the quarter-end shift in trade types is driven by
more purchases and fewer sales. We evaluate this in Table 4 by including indicators for Buy and Sell
and their interactions with Qtr_End and Qtr_Beg in our estimation of Equation (2), giving us four
variables of interest (Qtr_End*Buy, Qtr_End*Sell, Qtr_Beg*Buy and Qtr_Beg*Sell). This estimation
allows us to examine the change in frequency for the buys and sells of each trade type at the turn-ofthe-quarter. To focus on the turn-of-the-quarter, when both the recording of positions for disclosures
and the shift in trade types are highest, we drop the month-end indicators. For brevity, we do not report
the coefficient for the Buy indicator, which just captures the average difference in the Buy and Sell
frequency of each trade type (see Table 1).
This decomposition of trades shows portfolio-pumping has limited ability to explain the
observed dynamics. For each trade-type, we observe similar shifts in the quarter-end frequency of buys
and sells; the sign of the coefficient on Qtr_End×Buy (Qtr_Beg×Buy) equals the sign of Qtr_End×Sell
(Qtr_Beg×Sell) in each regression (Table 4, Columns 1-4). This similarity across trade types is not
predicted by portfolio pumping. For example, while portfolio pumping predicts the quarter-end
increase in Completing buy trades (Table 4, Column 2), which could reflect firms exerting price
pressure on existing positions, it does not predict the quarter-end decreases in Building and Initiating
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While short-sellers can engage in portfolio-pumping via increased sales (Blocher, Engelberg, and Reed, 2012), this
motive would be absent for the mutual funds, which only hold long positions, and pension funds covered by Ancerno.
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buy trades (Columns 1 and 4). Likewise, while portfolio pumping predicts the quarter-end decrease in
Initiating and Building sell trades (Columns 1 and 4), which could reflect funds avoiding sales on
positions they will continue to hold at quarter-end, it does not predict the quarter-end increases in
Completing and One-off sell trades (Columns 2-3).
Cross-sectional evidence on the positions traded differently around quarter-ends also indicate
that a number of the observed dynamics are likely driven by non-pumping motives. For example, if
funds are executing more quarter-end Completing and One-off buy trades to increase the valuation of
existing positions, we would expect these trades to be concentrated in a fund’s larger positions,
particularly those with lower liquidity. Moreover, we might expect funds with better performance to
have a greater incentive to pump prices (Carhart et al., 2002). To test these possibilities, we repeat the
estimation of Table 4 after adding interactions for the relative size of the fund’s position in the stock at
the time of the trade and the relative past performance of the fund. Contrary to what portfolio pumping
might predict, we find no evidence that the quarter-end increase in One-off and Completing buy trades
is concentrated among stocks where a fund likely holds a larger position. Instead, these additional
quarter-end trades tend to occur among a fund’s smaller positions (see Appendix Table C.1, Columns
2-3). In untabulated analyses, we also find no evidence that the quarter-end increase in One-off and
Completing buy trades is concentrated in positions that are both larger and illiquid. We also find little
evidence that a fund’s past performance is associated with the observed quarterly trade dynamics (see
Appendix Table C.2).16
16

To conduct these cross-sectional tests, we first needed to estimate the daily start positions for each fund that executes a
trade in the Ancerno data. Because the Ancerno data is anonymized, we cannot directly match funds to a separate database
of disclosed holdings. Instead, we approximate daily positions by netting out the sell and buy trades in each security over
the fund’s entire trading history. We can then calculate the daily return of the fund based on those estimated start positions
(setting any negative position to zero) and use these daily returns to calculate the compound return of the fund over a 12month window prior to the trade. Additional details on how we conduct these cross-sectional tests are found in the notes
of Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2. Our findings are similar if we instead estimate daily start positions and fund returns using
a noisy matching of Ancerno’s client-manager observations to mutual funds covered in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
This matching process involves comparing quarterly fund-level position changes (as identified using the quarterly
disclosures found in the CRSP Mutual Fund Data) to the position changes of individual Ancerno clients (as calculated using
Ancerno trades), being careful to match on the dates of the reported portfolios, and then selecting the closest match in
CRSP. Using these matches, we can then estimate an Ancerno client’s daily positions and returns using the matched data
found in CRSP.
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Additional untabulated analysis also suggests other motives must be at play besides portfoliopumping. For example, we find that sell trades where funds maintain a post-trade position contribute
to the observed quarter-end increases in One-off and Completing trades. This finding is inconsistent
with pumping as such trades would tend to depress the mark of the ongoing position. Likewise, the
quarter-end increase in One-off buys is partly driven by trades in stocks the fund does not already hold,
indicating that many of these are not trades designed to inflate an existing position.17 Moreover, using
the time stamps available in the Ancerno data, we find that excluding late-day trades (i.e., trades that
occur in the last half-hour or hour of trade) has no impact on the quarterly trade dynamics we document.
We also find no evidence that late-day trades become more frequent for any of the four trade types at
quarter end. The lack of a quarter-end increase in late-day trades is consistent with evidence suggesting
an absence of portfolio pumping trades in the Ancerno data in years following the publication of
Carhart et al. (2002) (Duong and Meschke, 2020). Our findings are also robust to limiting the sample
period to post-2002 trades.18

2.4.3.2 Managing disclosed information?
The observed quarter-end shift in trade dynamics might instead reflect funds managing the
information they disclose through quarterly position reporting requirements. Such trades could be
driven by either a desire to conceal or reveal a fund’s positions. For example, disclosure obligations
could cause funds to trade into positions at quarter-end that they do not plan to maintain or delay trades
that they would otherwise execute. Such trades make disclosures less informative of future holdings.
Alternatively, funds might accelerate the completion of planned positions or time their rebalancing
trades to be completed prior to disclosure. Such shifts in the timing of trades can make reported
positions more informative of future holdings.
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These tests use our earlier approximation of daily start positions, as discussed in Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2.
Our findings with respect to time stamps should be interpreted with caution. While some studies do use the available
time-stamp data in Ancerno (e.g., Duong and Meschke, 2020), others argue the time stamps provided in Ancerno are often
inaccurate (e.g., Hu et al., 2013). For example, 35.34% of trades in our sample do not record a valid time stamp.
18
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To analyze whether managing disclosed information contributes to the observed shift in trade
types, we first examine whether funds are more likely to subsequently reverse the additional
Completing and One-off trades executed on quarter-end days. An increase in such reversals would be
consistent with funds executing these additional end-of-quarter Completing and One-off trades to
conceal their fund’s future positions. Continuing to hold the positions taken by these additional endof-quarter Completing and One-off trades, however, would indicate these quarter-end trades make the
reported disclosures more informative about future holdings.
We test for an increase in quarter-end reversals by modifying our trade-type indicators to
differentiate between date t trades that are at least partially reversed over the next four weeks versus
those that are not. Specifically, we define Post_Oppositeist as an indicator equal to one when the sign
of trade by fund i, in security s, over the four weeks following day t is opposite in sign to the trade on
day t. We then use Post_Opposite to partition our two trade types for which future volume has a
different sign as day t volume (i.e., Completing and One-off trades). Completing and One-off trades
where Post_Oppositeist = 1 are labeled as Completing (with subsequent reversal) and One-off (with
subsequent reversal), respectively. The remaining Completing and One-off trades are those where the
fund executes zero additional trades in the following four weeks (i.e., Post_Oppositeist = 0). We label
these trades as Completing (with zero subsequent trade) and One-off (with zero subsequent trade),
respectively. We then re-estimate Equation (2) using these four new trade classifications as our
dependent variables.19 Table 5 reports these findings.
The observed shift in trade dynamics is consistent with funds timing their trading campaigns
and rebalancing trades so that they are completed before disclosure deadlines, thus making disclosures
more, not less, informative of future positions. The increase in quarter-end Completing trades is driven
entirely by trades followed by zero subsequent trades (Table 5, Columns 1-2). In other words, the
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As we illustrate in Appendix B, Completing and One-off trades are the only trade types for which Post_Opposite can take
a non-zero value. A full definition of these more refined trade classifications is provided in Appendix B.
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additional quarter-end Completing trades are informative of a fund’s holdings over at least the next
four weeks. They do not reflect funds establishing positions in order to disclose them and then trading
out of them shortly afterwards. Likewise, the increase in quarter-end One-off trades that are not
subsequently reversed (and hence, informative of future holdings) is nearly three times larger than the
increase in One-off trades that are at least partially reversed at the start of the quarter (Columns 3-4).
These latter findings are consistent with funds using One-off trades to rebalance positions to their
intended weights before reporting.
Another way in which funds could conceal their holdings from investors is by executing trades
at quarter-end that reverse positions taken previously or by waiting until after positions are recorded to
initiate the reversal of prior trades.

We investigate this possibility by creating an indicator,

Pre_Oppositeist, which equals one when the trade by fund i in security s in the four-week period
preceding a date t trade is opposite in sign to date t trade. We then interact this indicator with the
Initiating and One-off trade indicators to create two new dependent variables: Initiating (reversal of
prior position) and One-off (reversal of prior position). The remaining Initiating and One-off trades
(i.e., those with Pre_Oppositeist = 0) are labeled as Initiating (with zero prior trade) and One-off (with
zero prior trade).20 We then use these four new trade classifications as the dependent variables in our
estimation of Equation (2). Table 6 reports these estimates.
We again find evidence that is largely inconsistent with funds seeking to conceal positions. For
example, we find that the increase in Initiating trades at the beginning of the quarter is entirely
concentrated in those preceded by zero volume (Table 6, Columns 1-2). In other words, there is no
evidence the increase in Initiating trades at the start of each quarter is driven by trades that reverse
positions taken at the end of the prior quarter. We see similar, although attenuated, results for other
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As we illustrate in Appendix B, Initiating and One-off trades are the only two trade type indicators for which
Pre_Opposite can take non-zero values for some trades.
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month-ends. Moreover, less than half of the quarter-end increase in One-off trades is driven by trades
that reverse positions taken in the final weeks of the quarter (Columns 3-4).
The quarter-start spike in Initiating and One-off trades, however, could be driven by a different
type of motive to deceive. In particular, funds may be shifting the timing of new purchases to conceal
positions they intend to trade into and to manage investors’ risk perceptions (e.g., see Haugen and
Lakonishok, 1988; Musto, 1997, 1999). If true, these delayed trading campaigns will tend to make
funds’ disclosures less, rather than more, informative.
A number of our findings are consistent with this alternative form of managing information
flow. For example, the quarter-start spike in Initiating purchases is nearly twice as large as the increase
in Initiating sales (see Table 4). And in subsequent cross-sectional analysis, we find these delays are
concentrated among stocks where a fund does not already hold a large position and among small-cap
stocks, which Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) argue are perceived as riskier by investors. We now
turn to this cross-sectional evidence and additional motives for delaying trades.

2.4.3.2 Avoiding the disclosure of incomplete positions?
One of the most salient findings in our analysis is funds’ tendency to postpone Initiating trades
until after the quarter-end. In addition to a potential desire to conceal intended trades, another possible
motive for this delay is avoid reporting incomplete positions. This desire could lead funds to delay
initiating positions until the next quarter so as to create more time to fully build the intended position
before having to disclose it to investors. We analyze this possible motive using cross-sectional variation
to understand the types of stocks funds delay trading in until after quarter-end and the funds that are
more likely to delay trades.
There are a number of reasons why a fund might wish to initiate the building of a new position
or the selling of an existing position slowly over multiple days and trades. One reason is market
illiquidity, which can cause a fund’s trades to exert price pressure if the new position is established in
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a short time. Because of this, a fund’s value-weighted transaction price can be lower (higher) if they
build (sell) positions slowly. A second reason is that the accumulation of information that determines
how large of a position the fund wishes to build might occur slowly. For example, a fund might wish
to establish an initial position after doing preliminary research but only deploy more capital as they
learn more about the firm in the days and weeks that follow.
Because quarterly disclosures reveal a fund’s current positions, they can interfere with this
desire to slowly build or exit positions, especially in illiquid stocks and in companies where the fund
is still acquiring information or seeking to establish a larger position change. For example, the
disclosure of a toe-hold position might result in other funds attempting to front-run the position before
the fund is able to finish building its position. Moreover, the disclosure might result in investors asking
questions about the new position before the fund has had time to acquire all the information it seeks
and to decide how large of a position to build. The same issues apply when funds seek to reduce or
eliminate an existing position.
To examine these possible motives, we first test whether the delay in Initiating trades around
quarter-ends is concentrated in illiquid securities. The desire to build (or exit) a position slowly so as
to avoid exerting price pressure will be greater in illiquid stocks. To conduct this test, we construct
each security’s average illiquidity, using both the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and bid-ask
spreads, over the twelve-month period preceding every trade date. We then percentile rank stocks for
every trade date; for example, the most illiquid stock (using the prior twelve-months of trading data)
receives a percentile rank of 1 for that day, while the least illiquid stock receives a percentile rank of
0. We then repeat our main test of Table 3 for Initiating trades after including interactions with a stock’s
illiquidity rank. Table 7 reports the findings.
Consistent with funds seeking to create more room to complete trades, funds are more likely to
delay Initiating trades in illiquid securities at quarter-ends. The quarter-end decrease in Initiating trades
is concentrated among the most illiquid stocks, as is the increase Initiating trades at the start of a
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quarter. This finding holds both when using the Amihud illiquidity measure (Table 7, Column 1) and
when using bid-ask spreads as a measure of illiquidity (Column 2). We also find that the quarter-end
shift in Initiating trades is concentrated among small cap stocks (Column 3). This finding could be
driven by similar illiquidity reasons (as smaller cap stocks tend to be less liquid) or by a desire to avoid
reporting small-cap positions (Lakonishok and Haugen, 1988).
Our earlier findings on how trade dynamics vary as a function of existing position sizes are also
consistent with funds seeking to avoid the disclosure of new toe-hold positions before the fund has had
time to complete the position. This incentive to avoid reporting a toe-hold position is not applicable to
Initiating buy trades in stocks that the fund already maintains a large position (i.e., situations where a
fund has decided to increase the size of an existing, large position). Consistent with the toe-hold
explanation, we find that funds are less likely to delay initiating a larger position when they already
hold large position in that stock (see Appendix Table C.1, Column 1). The delay only occurs for stocks
in which they do not already hold a large position.
Next, we examine the fund characteristics that predict the quarter-end delay in Initiating trades.
Smaller funds and funds that trade less frequently are likely less able to manage illiquidity through the
employment of professional traders, sophisticated trading algorithms, and an ability to tap a larger
network of brokers to execute their trades. Hence, we might expect such funds to be more likely to
delay Initiating trades beyond the end of the quarter. To test this possibility, we calculate each fund’s
average AUM over the last 12 months using our earlier approximation of daily start positions, and we
create a fund-level measure of trade frequency by measuring the dollar value of securities traded by
that fund over the last 12 months. We then percentile rank funds based on these size and trade frequency
measures. The fund with the highest AUM receives a percentile rank of 1, while the smallest receives
a percentile rank of 0. A similar percentile rank is created for a fund’s overall trading frequency. We
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then repeat our main test of Table 3 for Initiating trades after including interactions with a fund’s size
of trade-frequency rank.21
In further support of funds seeking to create more room to complete trades, funds less able to
manage illiquidity are more likely to delay Initiating trades at quarter-ends. The quarter-end delay in
Initiating trades is concentrated among the smallest funds (see Table 7, Column 4) and funds that tend
to trade less frequently (Column 5).
Finally, we also find that quarter-beginning Initiating trades tend to be trades where the fund is
building (or exiting) a larger position and seeking to break the planned trade into more pieces,
consistent with funds delaying the start of new positions the fund knows will take more time to execute.
In particular, the average quarter-beginning Initiating trade is associated with the fund buying (or
selling) $8.78 million in the underlying security in that trade and through subsequent trades over the
next 28 days, which is 9.2% larger than $8.04 million typically bought (or sold) for Initiating trades
that occur on other days (p-value of difference = 0.03). The number of total trades in the sequence,
8.54, is 4.6% larger than that of other days (p-value = 0.01).

2.4.4 Portfolio informativeness around quarter-ends
The net impact of the observed quarterly trade dynamics on quarter-end portfolio
informativeness is unclear. Funds’ accelerated completion of planned trades at quarter-end will
increase how informative the disclosed portfolio is about the future portfolio, but funds’ delay in
initiating new positions until quarter-start decreases the informativeness of disclosed positions.
To analyze how portfolio informativeness changes around disclosures, we test whether quarterend positions explain more or less of a fund’s future positions. To conduct this test, we start by
identifying fund-date observations where we observe a trade.
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For each observation, we then

The subsequent findings are similar if we instead estimate a fund’s size using the CRSP Mutual Fund Data and the noisy
matching process between Ancerno and CRSP that is described in Section 4.3.1.
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approximate the relative size of the fund’s end-of-day position in every possible security s, Share(t)is,
and the trading date that occurs 28 days later, Share(t+28)is, where i indicates the fund that executed
the trade on date t and Share is the proportion of the fund’s portfolio that is held in security s. Share
is calculated for every security, including ones that were not traded on day t, and set equal to zero when
the fund holds no position in the security. We then run a cross-sectional regression of Share(t+28)is
on Share(t)is for each date t and fund i in our sample.22 We then extract the R-squared from these funddate regressions, Positions R_Squared, and regress it on indicators for quarter- and month-end days.
Specifically, we estimate
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑅 − 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑜𝑠_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 +
(3)
𝛽4 𝑀𝑜𝑠_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .
If the quarterly trading dynamics change portfolio informativeness on quarter- or month-ends, we
should detect a change in the Positions R-squared on those days. Table 8 presents the findings.
Consistent with the quarter-end trade dynamics increasing the informativeness of disclosures,
portfolio positions are more informative on the last day of the quarter. The coefficient on 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡
loads with a positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that quarter-end positions
explain more of a trading funds’ longer-term positions than positions on other days that they execute
trades (Table 8). Relative to average daily R-squared for other days (as given by the regression’s
intercept, 82.8%), quarter-end positions explain 0.025/0.828 = 2.97% more of the variation in a fund’s
positions 28 days later.23
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This approximation of relative end-of-day position sizes is done using the same method used in Appendix Tables C.1 and
C.2. For this estimation, we drop observations from the first year of our sample, 1998, because observing such a short timeseries of trades limits our ability to approximate portfolios.
23
In an untabulated test, we also find that funds’ quarter-end holdings do a better job of predicting future returns. In these
tests, we instead estimate the R-squared variable of Eqn. (3) using a regression of day t+28 returns, as calculated using
actual t+28 holdings, onto future returns, as predicted using current holdings. Similar to our findings for positions, quarterend portfolios do a better job of predicting future returns, again indicating that quarter-end portfolios are more informative
than portfolios from other days.
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The informativeness of portfolio positions is lower on the first day of the quarter for funds
executing trades. This finding suggests that the quarter-start decrease in Completing trades (i.e., trades
not followed by subsequent trades) and quarter-start increase in Initiating trades (i.e., trades that will
be followed by yet more trades that change the position) tend to make these quarter-start portfolios less
informative of fund’s future positions. We find little evidence of a change in portfolio informativeness
around other month-ends.

2.4.5 Commissions paid around quarter-ends
The observed quarter-end trade dynamics suggest that funds are executing trades around
quarter-ends for disclosure-related reasons rather than reasons involving the underlying value of
securities. In particular, funds appear to accelerate the completion of existing positions and execute
one-off rebalancing trades so as to make their quarterly disclosures more informative of their planned
future holdings. At the same time, funds delay initiating new positions until the start of the next quarter
so as to create more time to build positions before having to disclose them. Combined, these findings
suggest quarter-end trades are less driven by newly acquired information. To test this possibility, we
now analyze commissions paid around quarter-ends.
Commissions are often used by funds to compensate brokerages for information and research
services, with industry estimates suggesting that such compensation accounts for about 40% of
commissions (Blume, 1993). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests if an analyst motivates a trade by
providing you some new information, than there is an expectation that the recipient will use that broker
to execute the trade (e.g., see Blume, 1993; Irvine, 2001; Jackson, 2005). Because brokerages ration
research services from funds that are not sufficiently good customers, funds have incentives to pay
higher commissions when they receive information from analysts and/or salesmen (Groysberg and
Healy, 2013). Funds also sometimes pay higher commissions knowing that the broker will pass part
of it to a third party that provided research services (Blume, 1993). Consistent with these expectations
and an allocation of trades varying with the provision of information, brokerage volume does vary
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with analyst following and/or the information content of analyst reports (e.g., see Irvine, 2001; Irvine,
2004; Jackson, 2005, Niehaus and Zhang, 2007, and Lehmer, Lourie and Shanthikumar, 2021).
As such, commissions can provide a potential proxy for the amount of information a manager
obtained before executing the underlying trade. Therefore, if the trade dynamics we document are
driven by disclosure-based motives rather than any new information acquired by the fund manager, we
might also expect commissions to systematically decline around quarter-ends.
To test for quarter-end shifts in commissions, we estimate equation (2) using commissions per
share as the dependent variable. We conduct our commission analysis at the fund-broker-security-date
level as opposed to the fund-security-date level, which allows us to control for the broker and better
identify the cause of any potential shift in commissions. The use of this less aggregated data adds
approximately 15 million observations to our sample.
Consistent with quarter-end trades being less driven by information, commissions paid per
share decline at quarter-end, and this decline is driven by a drop in commissions paid within a given
fund-broker pair. Using the same fixed effect structure as in Tables 3 – 7, we find that commissions
decline both at the end and beginning of quarters (Table 9, Column 1). Relative to the average
commission per share of 2.33 cents, the magnitudes correspond to a drop of about 6.4% (3.0%) on the
last (first) day of the quarter. We then modify the regression to include broker-by-fund fixed effects
instead of just fund fixed effects. In doing this, the estimation now controls for any possible switch in
brokers and directly tests whether the commission per share differs for given fund-broker combination
around quarter ends. Our estimates are largely unchanged (Column 2). These findings confirm that
funds are paying a lower commission to a given broker at quarter ends than they typically pay that
same broker for trades executed at other points in the year.
Funds choosing to route their quarter-end trades through less expensive brokerages does not
appear to contribute to the quarter-end decline in commissions per share. To illustrate this finding, we
proxy for the ‘broker expensiveness’ using the average commissions per share received by the broker
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from all funds in a given year (AvgCommPerShareOfChosenBroker). We then use this average as the
dependent variable for each executed trade instead of the actual commission paid. If funds strategically
switch towards cheaper brokerages around quarter-ends, we should detect a drop in the average
expensiveness of brokers chosen by funds around quarter-ends. However, we find no evidence of this
(Table 9, Column 3).
Goldstein et al. (2009) argue that the compensation of brokers for information and services also
has an ex-post settling up component, as the payments need not coincide with the trades accompanied
by the high-quality services. Instead, funds can compensate brokers for their services over a longer
window so that total commissions paid are proportional to the value of the services rendered by the
broker. If such ex-post settling up occurs and if quarter-end trades are less driven by the timely
provision of information from brokers, then we should also expect the fund to pay the broker lower
total commissions over the course of a long window when a larger proportion of the trades executed
with that broker occur on quarter ends.
Consistent with Goldstein et al. (2009), we find evidence of such ex-post settling up between
funds and brokers. The proportion of a fund’s trades executed with a given broker in a year that occur
at quarter-end negatively predicts the total commissions paid by the fund to that broker for that year
(Table 9, Column 4). The results also hold when we include fund-broker fixed effects, indicating that
funds tend to pay the same broker less in years where a larger proportion of the trades executed through
that broker were on the last day of the quarter (Column 5).
Overall, these findings are consistent with quarter-end trades being disclosure-driven rather
than information-driven. Funds pay lower commissions to a given broker for trades executed on quarter
ends, and the total commissions they pay a broker over the year are also lower when a larger proportion
of trades executed with that broker occurred on quarter ends.24
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Furthermore, our finding that commissions vary around quarter ends for a given broker-fund pair is interesting and novel
in its own right. Goldstein et al. (2009) found that 43.5% of client-broker pairs only used a single per-share commission
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2.5 Price informativeness around quarter-ends
Our final test examines whether the cyclical trade patterns documented in the previous section
associate with shifts in price informativeness. If disclosure- rather than information-based motives
drive the quarter-end trade dynamics, price informativeness might decline at quarter-end.
To analyze whether price informativeness declines around disclosures, we test whether daily
returns around quarter- and month-end days explain less of longer-term returns. Days on which less
informed trading takes place should impound less information about long-term value into prices and
explain less of future returns. To conduct this test, we run cross-sectional regressions of the thirty-day
return, Ret(t,t+30), on the daily return, Ret(t), for each date t in our sample. We then extract the Rsquared from these daily regressions, Return R_Squared, and regress it on indicators for quarter- and
month-end days. Specifically, we estimate
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑅 − 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑜𝑠_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 +
(4)
𝛽4 𝑀𝑜𝑠_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 .
If price informativeness declines around quarter- or month-ends, we should detect a decline in the daily
Return R-squared for those days. Table 10 presents the findings of this estimation.25

during their sample period (1999-2003), and during our sample (1998-2010), this number is 35.4%. However, more than
half of client-broker pairs do exhibit variation in commissions paid, and our findings show that some of this variation is
driven by trades executed at quarter end. In untabulated findings, we also find the commission paid per share is higher
within broker-fund pairs in the days around earnings announcements, consistent with funds compensating brokers for timely
information provision around these announcements. Overall, our findings suggest that while funds do compensate brokers
for timely information provision through the total commissions they pay and some forms of ex post settling up, it also
appears that they sometimes do so on an individual trade level, providing yet additional evidence linking the level of
commissions paid to brokers’ information services.
25
Since this analysis does not require trade-level classifications, as constructed from the Ancerno data, we extend the sample
period for this and subsequent analysis to 1982-2018. However, the subsequent findings for price informativeness are robust
to limiting our sample to the same period as our Ancerno sample, 1998-2010.

29

Consistent with the quarter-end trade dynamics being driven by disclosure- rather than
information-based motives, price informativeness declines on the last day of the quarter. The
coefficient on 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 loads with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that
returns on quarter-ends explain less of longer-term returns. Relative to average daily R-squared for
other days (as given by the regression’s intercept, 3.83%), the magnitude of the decline is sizable.
Daily returns on the last day of the quarter are 0.0122/0.0382 = 32% less informative of the 30-day
return relative to that of other days. There is little evidence of a change in the relative informativeness
of daily returns on the first day of the quarter or on days around other month-ends.
The quarter-end decline in price informativeness is also present in the days leading up to the
quarter-end. This decline is shown in Figure 2, where we report the coefficients from a regression of
Return R_Squared on indicators for each of the five trading days before and after quarter-ends. Similar
to the quarter-end trade dynamics documented in Figure 1, we find a clear shift in price informativeness
at quarter-ends. Price informativeness declines monotonically in the days preceding the quarter-end,
but then returns to its average level at the start of the quarter.26
The quarter-end decline in price informativeness is also present for each quarter. Figure 3,
which plots the coefficients from a regression Return R_Squared on indicators for each month-end,
illustrates this pattern. Significant declines in price informativeness occur on each of the quarter-end
months, and the three largest month-end indicators all correspond to quarter-ends.27

Tests that use return reversals as an alternative measure of price informativeness yield similar

26

The absence of a quarter-start decrease in price informativeness indicates these price dynamics are not driven by an inflow of cash to the financial system (e.g., Etula et al., 2020), which occurs both at the end and the start of quarters.
27
The lower end-of-June Return R-squared is not explained by the reconstitution of Russell Investments’ various indexes,
which prior to 2004 occurred on the last trading day of June (e.g., see Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2019). In
untabulated analysis, we find similar end-of-June decreases in price informativeness in years where Russell’s reconstitution
does not occur on the last day of June.
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findings. Days when less information about long-term value gets impounded into prices should exhibit
greater subsequent reversals (Campbell et al., 1993; Biais et al., 1999). Consistent with quarter-end
returns including more ‘noise’ that subsequently flows out of price, we find that quarter-end days have
return reversals that are 219% larger over the subsequent 30 trading days. Moreover, quarter-end return
reversals are longer in duration than reversals on other days, with over half of the reversal occurring
after the first day of the next quarter. Figure 4 , which plots the coefficients from regressions of
Ret(t+1,t+s) onto Ret(t), Qtr_End, and Qtr_End×Ret(t) for each value of s between 1 and 30, illustrates
these larger quarter-end return reversals.

If funds execute less-informed trades in response to disclosures, then average illiquidity might
also decrease on quarter-end days, as market makers have less incentive to price protect. In untabulated
tests, this is exactly what we find. A stock’s Amihud measure of illiquidity is lower, on average, by
9.3% of a standard deviation on quarter-end days, and daily spreads are lower, on average, by 3.4% of
a standard deviation. The lower quarter-end illiquidity is consistent with an increase in uninformed
trading driving the quarter-end decrease in price informativeness.28

2.6 Conclusion
Using fund-level trades, we document that funds execute different types of trades around
quarter-end dates, which is when most funds record positions for subsequent disclosures. Funds are
more likely to start new trading campaigns after the quarter-end and more likely to complete existing
trading campaigns before the quarter-end, consistent with funds shifting the timing of planned trades
in response to upcoming disclosures. Trades that are not part of a trading campaign increase both before
and after the quarter end, while trades in the middle of a campaign decrease.

28

The decrease in average illiquidity is inconsistent with the quarter-end decline in price informativeness being driven by
financial institutions drawing down their supply of liquidity in response to their own reporting requirements.
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The documented patterns and additional findings suggest that funds seek to make their recorded
positions more informative of their planned allocation strategy while simultaneously avoiding the
disclosure of incomplete positions. For example, trades executed at quarter-end, including threefourths of trades not part of a larger trading campaign, continue to be held by the fund in the the next
quarter, thus making them informative of investors’ future ownership. And the delay in initiating
trading campaigns is concentrated in illiquid, small-cap stocks and among funds likely less able to
quickly trade into new positions, consistent with funds delaying the start of trading campaigns that will
require more time to build. Part of the delay might also be driven by a motive to avoid disclosing some
positions entirely. Other disclosure-driven motives, such as portfolio-pumping, do not appear to be the
key drivers of these quarter-end trade dynamics, and on net, we find that portfolio informativeness
increases on quarter-end days.
Consistent with quarter-end shift in portfolio formation being driven by disclosure-related
motives unrelated to stocks’ intrinsic values, we also document that price informativeness declines at
quarter-end. Returns on quarter-end days explain less of the variation in longer-term price changes
than returns on other days, and this is true for each of the four calendar-year quarter-ends. Moreover,
the price distortions associated with quarter-ends persist for several days.
Our study makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature
on the consequences of reporting positions. Our findings suggest that funds adjust the timing of when
they build, complete, and initiate new positions in response to the quarterly reporting cycle. Second,
we show that some of the shifts in trade dynamics improve the informativeness of portfolio holdings
prior to quarter-ends, whereas the prior literature has largely investigated disclosure-based motives
where funds seek to deceive investors around quarter-end. Third, we document that these quarterly
trade dynamics coincide with a quarter-end increase in portfolio informativeness and a decrease in
price informativeness. Taken together, these results suggest that although funds trade into positions
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which tend to make portfolio disclosures more informative about future holdings, these trades
simultaneously decrease price informativeness.
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Figure 2.1 – Fund trading behavior around quarter-ends
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Panel C: Abnormal frequency of One-off trades
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Panel D: Abnormal frequency of Building trades
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We compute each graph by regressing the trade category type indicator (unique at the fund-security-date level) on day
indicators for each of the five days before and after the quarter-end using the Ancerno data from 1998 to 2010 and the
estimation given by Equation (1). The bar represents the regression coefficient, and the t-statistics for each coefficient,
computed by clustering two-ways on security and month-year, are provided in parentheses.
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Figure 2.2 – Daily price informativeness, measured using Return Rsquared, by day around quarter-ends
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This figure plots the variation in the daily R-squared from running daily cross-sectional regressions of the thirty-day
return, Ret(t, t+30), on daily returns, Ret(t) from 1982 to 2018. The R-squared from these daily regressions, Return
R-squared, are then regressed on day indicators for each of the five days before and after the quarter-end dates. The
bar represents the difference in R-squared on that day relative to that of other, non-quarter-end days, and the tstatistics associated with this variation, where standard errors clustered by month-year, are provided in parentheses.
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Figure 2.3 – Variation in daily price informativeness, measured using
Return R-squared, by month-ends
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This figure plots how the average daily R-squared obtained from running daily cross-sectional regressions of the
thirty-day return, Ret(t, t+30), on daily returns, Ret(t) from 1982 to 2018 varies on the last day of each month relative
to all other non-month-end days. Each bar represents the average difference in the R-squared on that month-end
relative to non-month-end days, and the t-statistics corresponding to this difference, where standard errors clustered
by month-year, are provided in parentheses. Orange bars correspond to quarter-end indicators while blue bars
correspond to other month-end indicators.
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Figure 2.4 – Cumulative return reversals from t+1, t+30
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This figure graphs the return reversal coefficients obtained by regressing future returns, Ret(t+1, t+s), (where
‘s’ varies from 1 to 30) on daily returns (Ret(t)), indicators for quarter-end (Qtr_End) indicators, and
interactions of daily returns with the indicator variables.
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Table 2.1 – Mutual fund disclosure date frequencies
(1)

(2)

Thomson Reuters S-12
value – weighted
portfolio disclosures
Quarter End
Other Month End
All Other Dates

1982 - 2018
80.89%
19.08%
0.03%

(3)

CRSP value –
weighted portfolio disclosures
2001 - 2007
66.87%
33.13%
0.00%

2008 - 2018
45.48%
53.46%
1.06%

This table tabulates the value weight of reported holdings disclosed using the Thomson Reuters
(S12) and CRSP databases by quarter-end dates (i.e., the last trading days of March, June,
September, and December), other month-end dates (i.e., the last trading days of all other
months), and non-month end dates (i.e., all other trading days). The CRSP sample is divided
into two time periods: 2001-2007 (during which disclosure data were sourced from
Morningstar) and 2008-2018 (during which disclosure data were sourced from Lipper).
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Table 2.2 – Trade characteristics by trade type
Trade type
Initiating
Completing
Building
One-off

Percentage
buy
49.1%
54.9%
56.1%
47.2%

Absolute dollar
volume
$747,511
$664,417
$909,880
$505,925

Absolute share
volume
27,585
24,533
32,621
18,969

Dollar volume
buy
$744,202
$612,447
$823,705
$504,713

Dollar volume
sell
-$750,702
-$727,565
-$1,019,857
-$507,002

This table tabulates the descriptive statistics of the four trade types – Initiating, Completing, Building and One-off
– using all transactions marked by Ancerno as ‘good trades’ over the period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades
from client managers that do not execute at least one trade in both the prior and subsequent month. The statistics
reported are sample averages for each type of trade, and definitions for each of the four trade classifications can be
found in Section 2 and Appendixes A and B.
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Table 2.3 - Variation in trade-type frequency around quarter- and month-ends
Qtr_End
Qtr_Beg
Month_End
Month_Beg

Fund FE
Security-by-month FE
Non-linear volume controls
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Two-way Clustered S.E
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Initiating
-0.025305***
(-8.04)
0.014904***
(4.67)
-0.007429***
(-4.13)
0.007413***
(3.85)

Completing
0.022436***
(5.72)
-0.010826***
(-4.75)
0.003438*
(1.73)
-0.008256***
(-5.35)

One-off
0.047503***
(7.31)
0.026225***
(7.47)
0.030542***
(10.14)
0.008085***
(2.89)

Building
-0.044634***
(-8.63)
-0.030303***
(-7.62)
-0.026550***
(-9.53)
-0.007242***
(-3.00)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.024

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.025

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.107

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.128

This table reports regressions of our four trade-type indicators (Initiating, Completing, One-off, Building) on indicators for dates around the
change in months and quarters as well as controls. Specifically, we run the following regression: 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 +
𝛽2 𝑄𝑡𝑟_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 × 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝐸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 . We estimate this regression using all transactions
marked by Ancerno as ‘good trades’ over the period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades from client managers that do not execute at least
one trade in both the prior and subsequent month. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), DollVols,t, Abs(DollVols,t) and log(DollVols,t).
Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of both with our four variables of interest.
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Table 2.4 - Variation in buy and sell frequencies by trade-type around quarter-end

Qtr_End*Buy
Qtr_End*Sell
Qtr_Beg*Buy
Qtr_Beg*Sell

Fund FE
Security-by-month FE
Non-linear volume controls
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Two-way Clustered S.E
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
Initiating
-0.01880***
(-4.88)
-0.03313***
(-6.72)
0.01998***
(5.81)
0.01016**
(2.54)

(2)
Completing
0.01618***
(3.84)
0.03017***
(5.20)
-0.01062***
(-3.50)
-0.01141***
(-4.30)

(3)
One-off
0.04914***
(6.50)
0.04431***
(5.94)
0.02833***
(7.87)
0.02007***
(3.37)

(4)
Building
-0.04652***
(-7.23)
-0.04136***
(-7.62)
-0.03769***
(-8.28)
-0.01882***
(-2.95)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.023

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.025

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.107

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.128

This table reports regressions of our four trade-type indicators (Initiating, Completing, One-off, Building) on the interactions between
indicators for dates around the change in quarters, Qtr_End and Qtr_Beg, and indicators for whether the trade was a purchase, Buy, or

sale, Sell. We also include other controls (see below) and an indicator for Buy, but for brevity, we do not report the coefficients on
these additional controls. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A . We estimate this regression using all transactions marked
by Ancerno as ‘good trades’ over the period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades from client managers that do not execute at least one trade
in both the prior and subsequent month. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), DollVols,t, Abs(DollVols,t) and log(DollVols,t).
Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of both with our four variables of interest.
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Table 2.5 – Abnormal frequency of Completing and One-off trades that are and are not
subsequently reversed around quarter- and month-ends

Qtr_End
Qtr_Beg
Month_End
Month_Beg
Fund fixed effects
Security-by-month fixed effects
Non-linear volume controls
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Two-way clustered standard errors
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
Completing (with zero
subsequent trade)
0.0227***
(6.32)
-0.0067***
(-4.87)
0.0066***
(5.23)
-0.0062***
(-5.90)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.075

(2)
Completing (with
subsequent reversal)
-0.0003
(-0.12)
-0.0042**
(-2.45)
-0.0033**
(-2.47)
-0.0021*
(-1.85)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.062

(3)
One-off (with zero
subsequent trade)
0.0355***
(5.56)
0.0123***
(5.28)
0.0098***
(4.60)
0.0048**
(2.04)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.224

(4)
One-off (with
subsequent reversal)
0.0120***
(3.87)
0.0139***
(5.17)
0.0208***
(6.78)
0.0033**
(2.04)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.060

This table reports regressions of the Completing and One-off trade indicators interacted with the Post_Opposite indicator [resulting in four trade
classifications: Completing (with zero subsequent trade), Completing (with subsequent reversal), One-off (with zero subsequent trade), and One-off
(with subsequent reversal)] on indicators for dates around the change in months and quarters as well as controls. A full definition of the four trade
classifications is provided in Section 3.3.2 and Appendixes A and B. We estimate this regression using all transactions marked by Ancerno as ‘good
trades’ over the period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades from client managers that do not execute at least one trade in both the prior and subsequent
month. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), DollVols,t, Abs(DollVols,t) and log(DollVols,t).
Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of both with our four variables of interest.
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Table 2.6 – Abnormal frequency of Initiating and One-off trades that do and do not reverse
prior positions around quarter- and month-ends

Qtr_End
Qtr_Beg
Month_End
Month_Beg
Fund fixed effects
Security-by-month fixed effects
Non-linear volume controls
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Two-way clustered standard errors
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
Initiating (with zero
prior trade)
-0.0152***
(-6.40)
0.0158***
(5.55)
-0.0047***
(-3.18)
0.0051***
(3.98)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.074

(2)
Initiating (reversal of
prior position)
-0.0101***
(-5.56)
-0.0009
(-0.51)
-0.0027***
(-2.71)
0.0023
(1.47)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.060

(3)
One-off (with zero
prior trade)
0.0245***
(3.11)
0.0182***
(5.99)
0.0111***
(5.77)
0.0042*
(1.75)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.222

(4)
One-off (reversal of
prior position)
0.0230***
(6.20)
0.0080***
(2.88)
0.0195***
(6.99)
0.0039**
(2.36)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm & Month
50,192,414
0.063

This table reports regressions of the Initiating and One-off trade indicators interacted with the Pre_Opposite indicator [resulting in four trade
classifications: Initiating (with zero prior trade), Initiating (reversal of prior position), One-off (with zero prior trade), and One-off (reversal of prior
position)] on indicators for dates around the change in months and quarters as well as controls. A full definition of the four trade classifications is
provided in Section 3.3.2 and Appendixes A and B. We estimate this regression using all transactions marked by Ancerno as ‘good trades’ over the
period 1998 – 2010 after excluding trades from client managers that do not execute at least one trade in both the prior and subsequent month. Standard
errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), DollVols,t, Abs(DollVols,t) and log(DollVols,t).
Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of both with our four variables of interest.
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Table 2.7 – Heterogeneity in the quarter-end delay in Initiating
trades
Qtr_Beg
Qtr_End
Qtr_Beg*Rank(Amihud)
Qtr_End*Rank(Amihud)

(1)
Initiating
0.0032
(1.12)
-0.0039
(-1.61)
0.0235***
(3.37)
-0.0433***
(-6.28)

Qtr_Beg*Rank(Spread)

(2)
Initiating
0.0042
(1.51)
-0.0102***
(-4.34)

(3)
Initiating
0.0252***
(4.18)
-0.0478***
(-7.68)

(4)
Initiating
0.0427***
(4.70)
-0.0765***
(-8.29)

(5)
Initiating
0.0389***
(4.43)
-0.0794***
(-7.83)

0.0215***
(3.74)
-0.0311***
(-5.38)

Qtr_End*Rank(Spread)
Qtr_Beg*Rank(MarketCap)

-0.0202***
(-2.88)
0.0434***
(6.05)

Qtr_End*Rank(MarketCap)
Qtr_Beg*Rank(Fund AUM)

-0.0311***
(-3.05)
0.0566***
(5.87)

Qtr_End*Rank(Fund AUM)
Qtr_Beg*Rank(Fund Turnover)

-0.0267***
(-2.68)
0.0597***
(5.62)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
50,192,243
0.024

Qtr_End* Rank(Fund Turnover)

Fund fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Security-by-month fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Non-linear volume controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
50,192,549
50,192,549
50,192,549
50,192,243
Observations
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.024
Adjusted R-squared
This table reports regressions of our Initiating trade indicators on the interactions between indicators for dates around the
change in quarters, Qtr_End and Qtr_Beg, and proxies for the relative illiquidity of the underlying security [Rank(Amihud)
and Rank(Spread), Columns 1-2], relative market cap of the underlying security [Rank(MarketCap), Column 3] and relative
size and trade frequency of the fund executing the trade [Rank(Fund AUM) and [Rank(Fund Turnover), Columns 4-5]. We
also include other controls (see below) in each specification, including uninteracted controls for each aforementioned Rank
variable, but for brevity, we do not report the coefficients on these additional controls. Full variable definitions are provided
in Appendix A. We estimate this regression using all firm-fund-transactions marked by Ancerno over the period 1998 – 2010.
Robust standard errors are clustered by security and month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), DollVols,t, Abs(DollVols,t) and
log(DollVols,t). Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of both with our four
variables of interest.
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Table 2.8 – Portfolio informativeness around quarter-ends
(1)
Positions
R-Squared
-0.042***
(-3.68)
0.025***
(3.71)
0.002
(0.18)
0.69
(0.18)
0.827***
(164.57)
Month
2,568,249
0.001

Qtr_Beg
Qtr_End
Month_Beg
Month_End
Intercept
Clustered standard errors
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

This table reports regressions of Positions R-squared on indicators for dates around the change in months and
quarters. To conduct this test, we start by identifying fund-date observations where we observe a trade. For each
observation, we then approximate the relative size of the fund’s end-of-day position in every possible security s,
Share(t)is, and the trading date that occurs 28 days later, Share(t+28)is, where i indicates the fund that executed
the trade on date t and Share is the proportion of the fund’s portfolio that is held in security s. Share is calculated
for every security, including ones that were not traded on day t, and set equal to zero when the fund holds no
position in the security. We then run a cross-sectional regression of Share(t+28) on Share(t) for each date t and
fund i in our sample and use the resulting R-squared, Positions R-squared, as the outcome variable in the tabulated
regression. Standard errors are clustered by month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9 – Commissions

Qtr_Beg
Qtr_End

(1)

(2)

Commissions
PerShare

Commissions
PerShare

-0.0007***
(-4.87)
-0.0015***
(-5.24)

-0.0004***
(-4.07)
-0.0011***
(-4.99)

(3)
AvgComm
PerShareOf
ChosenBroker
0.0001
(0.43)
0.0003
(0.59)

Scaled_Vol_Qtr_Beg
Scaled_Vol_Qtr_End
Security-by-month fixed effects
Fund-by-broker fixed effects
Fund fixed effects
Broker fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Clustered standard errors
Adjusted R-squared
Observations

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Firm & Month
0.549
65,597,203

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Firm & Month
0.665
65,458,362

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Firm & Month
0.040
65,458,362

(4)

(5)

Sum
Commissions

Sum
Commissions

0.0170
(1.12)
-0.0388*
(-2.06)
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year
0.952
618,912

0.0040
(0.20)
-0.0405**
(-2.43)
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Year
0.967
618,912

This table reports the variation in commissions paid by funds to brokers around quarter beginnings and ends. Columns 1 and 2 use commissions
per share at the fund-firm-transaction-broker level as the dependent variable. Column 3 uses the average commissions paid by all funds to the
broker for a stock over the entire year as the dependent variable. Columns 4 and 5 use the total commissions paid by the fund to the broker across
all stocks over the entire year as the dependent variable and the scaled volume of transactions conducted on quarter-beginning and ending days as
the independent variables. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. We estimate all the regressions using all firm-fund-brokertransactions over the period 1998 – 2010. Standard errors are two-way clustered by security and month-year in columns 1-3 and by year in columns
4-5. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 2.10 – Price informativeness around quarter- and month-ends
Return
R-squared
0.0015
(0.58)
-0.0122***
(-9.10)
0.0018
(1.26)
-0.0013
(-0.99)
0.0382***
(81.59)
1982-2018
Month
0.003
9329

Qtr_Beg
Qtr_End
Month_Beg
Month_End
Intercept
Sample
Clustered standard errors
Adjusted R-squared
Observations

This table reports variation in the relative informativeness of daily returns
around quarter-end days over the period 1982 to 2018. We measure the
informativeness of daily returns using Return R-squared, which is the daily
R-squared obtained from daily cross-sectional regressions of the thirty-day
return, Ret(t, t+30), on daily returns, Ret(t). Our sample to compute the daily
R-squareds consists of all firm-security days from 1982 – 2018 having (i) a
listing on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq, (ii) exchange code 10 or 11, and (iii) a
market capitalization of at least $10 million. Robust standard errors are
clustered by month-year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix 2.A – Variable definitions
Variable Name

Variable Description

Change-of-quarter and month-end indicators (Tables 2-10)
Qtr_Endt

Qtr_Begt

Indicator variable set equal to one if the date t is the last trading day of a quarter (i.e., the last
trading day of March, June, September, and December).
Indicator variable set equal to one if date t is the first trading day of a quarter (i.e., the first
trading day of January, April, July, and October).
Indicator variable set equal to one if the date t is the last trading day of a month that does not

Month_Endt

correspond to the change in a calendar quarter (i.e., the last trading day all months, except
March, June, September, and December).
Indicator variable set equal to one if the date t is the first trading day of a month that does not

Month_Begt

correspond to the change in a calendar quarter (i.e., the first trading day all months, except
January, April, July, and October).

Trade-type dependent variables (Tables 2-4, Table 7, Figure 1, and Appendix Tables A1-A2)
Indicator variable set equal to one if the trade initiates a new position. Specifically, we set the
indicator equal to one if the sign of fund i’s trade on date t (i.e., buy or sell) in security s [i.e.,
Initiatingi,s,t

Sign(Voli,s,t)] equals the sign of trading volume in that security by that fund over the next four
weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=1 to 28Voli,s,t+i)] but does not equal the sign of trade volume over the past four
weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=-28 to -1Voli,s,t-i)].
Indicator variable set equal to one if the trade completes the funds position in a security.

Completingi,s,t

Specifically, we set the indicator equal to one if the sign of fund i’s trade on date t (i.e., buy or
sell) in security s [i.e., Sign(Voli,s,t)] equals the sign of trading volume in that security by that

fund over the past four weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=-28 to -1Voli,s,t-i)] but does not equal the sign of trade
volume over the next four weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=1 to 28Voli,s,t+i)].
Indicator variable set equal to one if a trade continues to build a position. Specifically, we set
Buildingi,s,t

the indicator equal to one if the sign of fund i’s trade on date t (i.e., buy or sell) in security s [i.e.,
Sign(Voli,s,t)] equals the sign of trading volume in that security by that fund over the next four
weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=1 to 28Voli,s,t+i)] and the past four weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=-28 to -1Voli,s,t-i)].
Indicator variable set equal to one if the shift in a funds position is unrelated to the sign of either
past or future trades. Specifically, we set the indicator equal to one if the sign of fund i’s trade

One-offi,s,t

on date t (i.e., buy or sell) in security s [i.e., Sign(Voli,s,t)] does not equal the sign of trading
volume in that security by that fund over the next four weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=1 to 28Voli,s,t+i)] or the
past four weeks [i.e., Sign(𝛴i=-28 to -1Voli,s,t-i)].

Trade-type explanatory variables (Table 4 and Appendix Tables A1-A2)
Buyi,s,t

Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade by fund i, in security s, on date t is a purchase.

Selli,s,t

Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade by fund i, in security s, on date t is a sale.

Trade-type dependent variables (Table 5)
Indicator variable set equal to one when the sign of trade by fund i, in security s, over the four
Post_Oppositei,s,t

weeks following day t [Sign(𝛴i=1 to 28Voli,s,t+i)] is opposite in sign to the trade on day t
[Sign(Voli,s,t)].

Completing (with zero subsequent trade)i,s,t

Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both a Completing trade and has a
Post_Opposite value equal to 0.

Completing (with subsequent reversal)i,s,t

One-off (with zero subsequent trade)i,s,t

One-off (with subsequent reversal)i,s,t

Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both a Completing trade and has a
Post_Opposite value equal to 1.
Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both a One-off trade and has a
Post_Opposite value equal to 0.
Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both a One-off trade and has a
Post_Opposite value equal to 1.

Trade-type dependent variables (Table 6)
Indicator variable set equal to one when the sign of trade by fund i, in security s, over the four
Pre_Oppositei,s,t

weeks preceding day t [Sign(𝛴i=-28 to -1Voli,s,t-i)] is opposite in sign to the trade on day t
[Sign(Voli,s,t)].

Initiating (with zero prior trade)i,s,t

Initiating (reversal of prior position)i,s,t

One-off (with zero prior trade)i,s,t

One-off (reversal of prior position)i,s,t

Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both an Initiating trade and has a
Pre_Opposite value equal to 0.
Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both an Initiating trade and has a
Pre_Opposite value equal to 1.
Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both an One-off trade and has a
Pre_Opposite value equal to 0.
Indicator variable set equal to one when the trade is both an One-off trade and has a
Pret_Opposite value equal to 1.

Fund- and firm-characteristic explanatory variables (Table 7)
Percentile rank of a security's Amihud illiquidity over the last 12 months. To construct this
Rank(Amihud)s,m

measure, we begin by calculating the average Amihud illiquidity measure for each security s in
the previous 12 months, Amihud, by calculating the security’s absolute return divided by dollar

volume on a daily basis and then taking the average of that daily ratio over the previous 12
months. Using this Amihud, we then rank securities in the given month m by constructing
Rank(Amihud), where the most illiquid stock (i.e., the stock with the highest Amihud) receives a
Rank(Amihud) equal to one for that month, while the least illiquid stock receives a
Rank(Amihud) value of 0.
Percentile rank of a security's average bid-ask spread over the last 12 months. To construct this
measure, we begin by calculating the average bid-ask spread for each security s in the previous
12 months, Spread, where the spread is calculated as the difference between the ask and the bid
Rank(Spread)s,m

prices divided by the average of these prices. Then, using this Spread, we rank securities in the
given month m by constructing Rank(Spread), where the most illiquid stock (i.e., the stock with
the highest average bid-ask spread in the previous 12 months) receives a Rank(Spread) equal to
one for that month, while the least illiquid stock receives a Rank(Spread) value of zero.
Percentile rank of a security's market capitalization as of prior month’s last trading date. To
construct this measure, we begin by calculating the market cap for each security s on the last
trading date of the previous month, MarketCap. Then, using this MarketCap, we rank securities

Rank(MarketCap)s,m

in the given month m by constructing Rank(MarketCap), where the security with the largest
MarketCap (i.e., the stock with the highest market cap at the end of the prior month) receives a
Rank(MarketCap) equal to one for that month, while the stock with the smallest market cap
receives a value of zero.
Percentile rank of the AUM for the fund executing a trade using the estimated average AUM of

Rank(Fund AUM)i,m

that fund over the last 12 months. To estimate the AUM, we approximate the daily start position
of each fund i by netting out the sell and buy trades in each security over the fund’s entire trading
history. We then use stock prices from CRSP to estimate a daily AUM from these start positions

(setting any negative position to zero) and take the average of these over the last 12 months as
our proxy for a fund’s average AUM, Fund AUM. Using this Fund AUM, we then rank funds in
the given month m by constructing Rank(Fund AUM), where Rank(Fund AUM) equals 1 for the
fund with the highest Fund AUM that month, while Rank(Fund AUM) equals 0 for the fund with
the lowest Fund AUM that month.
Percentile rank of fund turnover for the fund executing a trade using the dollar value of securities
traded over the last 12 months. To construct this measure, we calculate the dollar value of
securities traded over the last 12 months for each fund i as our proxy for a fund’s trade
Rank(Fund Turnover)i,m

frequency, Fund Turnover. Using this Fund Turnover, we then rank funds in the given month m
by constructing Rank(Fund Turnover), where the fund with the greatest turnover over the last 12
months (i.e., the fund with the highest Fund Turnover) receives a Rank(Fund Turnover) equal to
one for that month, while the fund with the lowest turnover receives a value of 0.

Portfolio informativeness dependent variable (Table 8)
The R-squared obtained for fund i on date t from running a cross-sectional, security-level
regression of the fund’s position sizes 28 days later, Share(t+28)i, on the fund’s current position
Positions R-squaredit

sizes, Share(t)is, where Share is the proportion of the fund i's holdings in security s. Position
sizes are estimated using a fund’s entire Ancerno trading history, and Share is set to zero if the
fund does not have a position in the security.

Commissions dependent and explanatory variables (Table 9)
CommissionsPerSharei,q,s,t

AvgCommPerShareOfChosenBrokers,q,y

Commissions paid per share for trading in security s by fund i on trade date t to broker q.
Winsorized at ten cents per share and zero cents per share.
Average commission per share paid by all funds to broker q for trades in security s averaged over
the calendar year y. Winsorized at ten cents per share and zero cents per share.

SumCommissionsi,q,y

Scaled_Vol_Qtr_Begi,q,y

Scaled_Vol_Qtr_Endi,q,y

Log of total commissions paid by fund i to broker q over the entire year calendar y. Winsorized
at 1 and 99 percent.
Proportion of volume traded on the first day of quarter to the total volume traded over the entire
year y by fund i through broker q.
Proportion of volume traded on the last day of quarter to the total volume traded over the entire
year y by fund i through broker q.

Price informativeness dependent variable (Table 10 and Figures 2-3)
Return R-squaredt

The R-squared obtained for date t from running a daily cross-sectional security-level regression
of thirty-day returns, Ret(t, t+30), on daily returns, Ret(t).

Stock-level return reversal variables (Figure 4)
Ret(t)

Return on trade date t.

Ret(t+1, t+s)

Compound return if held from trading day t+1 to trading day t+s.

Ancerno analysis control variables (Tables 3 – 7)
We subtract buy dollar volume from sell dollar volume across all trades made by fund i at date t,
%FundFlowsi,t

and then divide by the sum of buy and sell volume across trades, to capture the flow of funds on
date t.
We subtract buy dollar volume from sell dollar volume across all trades made by fund i on date t.

$FundFlowsi,t

We then take the log of the absolute value of dollar volume and multiply by the sign of the trade
(i.e., we take the log of signed $ flows to reduce the influence of outliers).

SignShareVols,t
ShareVols,t

Sign of share volume in security s on date t (i.e., one for buy trades and negative one for sell
trades).
Share volume in security s on date t.

Abs(ShareVols,t)
log(ShareVols,t)

Absolute value of share volume in security s on date t.
Log of the absolute value of share volume in security s on date t, multiplied by the sign of share
volume.

DollVols,t

Signed dollar volume in security s on date t.

Abs(DollVols,t)

Absolute value of dollar volume in security s on date t.

log(DollVols,t)

Log of the absolute value of dollar volume in security s on date t, multiplied by the sign of share
volume.

Appendix 2.B – Trade type definitions
In our primary classification scheme, we classify trades based on the similarity of a fund’s
date t trade in security s with the cumulative trade by that fund in that security over the prior and
subsequent four weeks. Using S to denote a fund’s trade volume over a four-week interval having
the same sign as the day t trade and NS to denote trade volume that does not have the same sign,
there are four possible classifications for each date t trade: S-S, NS-S, S-NS and NS-NS, where
the first (second) label indicates the sign of prior (subsequent) four-week trade volume. For
example, NS-S indicates a trade on date t that does not have the same sign as trade volume in the
prior four weeks but does have the same sign as trades in the subsequent four weeks. We label
these four trade t classifications as Building, Initiating, Completing, and One-off, respectively.
The trade-type classifications can be expanded by differentiating whether the NS trades
reflect trades of the opposite sign as trade date t volume (O) and those with zero volume (Z),
resulting in a total of nine classifications. For example, a Completing trade (S-NS) can be
subdivided into Completing trades that are at least partially reversed over the next four weeks (SO) and Completing trades that are followed by zero trade volume (S-Z). And, Initiating trades
(NS-S) can be subdivided into Initiating trades that begin the reversal of a prior trading direction
(O-S) and Initiating trades that reflect the beginning of trades in the security (Z-S). The labels we
assign to these nine possible trade classifications are provided in the below table:
Trade classifications
S-S [Building]
S-Z [Completing (with zero subsequent trade)]
S-O [Completing (with subsequent reversal)]
Z-S [Initiating (new position)]
O-S [Initiating (reversal of prior trade)]
Z-Z [One-off (preceded and followed by zero trade)]
Z-O [One-off (with subsequent reversal)]

Pre_Opposite = 1
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO

Post_Opposite = 1
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES

O-Z [One-off (reversal of prior trade)]
O-O [One-off (preceded and followed by opposing trades)]

YES
YES

NO
YES

We use these additional classifications in Tables 5-6 when we investigate whether the
quarterly variation in trade types we document is concentrated in trades that reverse a prior position
or are subsequently reversed. Specifically, in Table 5 we investigate whether the quarter-end
increase in date t trades with NS post-trade volume (i.e., Completing and One-off trades) is driven
by an increase in trades that are subsequently reversed by the fund (i.e., S-O, Z-O, and O-O trades)
or not (i.e., S-Z, Z-Z, and O-Z trades). In Table 6, we investigate whether the increase in date t
trades with NS pre-trade volume (i.e., Initiating and One-off) at the start of each quarter is driven
by trades that reverse previous trades (i.e., O-S, O-Z, and O-O trades) or instead have zero prior
trade volume (i.e., Z-S, Z-Z, and Z-O trades).

Appendix 2.C – Additional tables
Table 2.C.1 – Relative magnitude of position within a fund and tradetype frequency around quarter-ends
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Initiating
Completing
One-off
Building
-0.1034***
0.0428***
0.1039***
-0.0432***
Qtr_End*Buy
(-8.24)
(3.73)
(5.18)
(-3.17)
-0.0271***
0.0442***
0.0662***
-0.0833***
Qtr_End*Sell
(-2.85)
(2.83)
(4.37)
(-8.83)
0.0383***
-0.0355***
0.0381***
-0.0410***
Qtr_Beg*Buy
(3.83)
(-4.41)
(3.27)
(-3.94)
0.0316***
-0.0382***
0.0469***
-0.0402***
Qtr_Beg*Sell
(4.16)
(-8.18)
(4.87)
(-4.04)
0.1202***
-0.0367***
-0.0836***
0.0001
Qtr_End*Buy*Rank(Position)
(8.80)
(-2.79)
(-3.94)
(0.01)
-0.0033
-0.0310*
-0.0373**
0.0717***
Qtr_End*Sell*Rank(Position)
(-0.32)
(-1.66)
(-2.21)
(6.76)
-0.0246**
0.0341***
-0.0147
0.0052
Qtr_Beg*Buy*Rank(Position)
(-2.05)
(3.91)
(-1.05)
(0.42)
-0.0382***
0.0477***
-0.0483***
0.0388***
Qtr_Beg*Sell*Rank(Position)
(-4.29)
(8.69)
(-4.29)
(3.45)
Fund FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Security-by-month FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Non-linear volume controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Two-way clustered SE
Firm & Month
Firm & Month
Firm & Month
Firm & Month
0.038
0.033
0.113
0.135
Adjusted R-squared
50,192,549
50,192,549
50,192,549
50,192,549
Observations
This table reports regressions of our four trade type indicators (Initiating, Completing, One-off, Building) on the
interactions between indicators for dates around the change in quarters, Qtr_End and Qtr_Beg, indicators for whether the
trade was a purchase, Buy, or sale, Sell, and the normalized rank of the security’s position in a fund’s portfolio at the
start of the trading day, Rank(Position). We also include other controls (see below), including Buy and the interactions
of the Buy and Sell indicators with Rank(Position), but for brevity, we do not report the coefficients on these additional
controls. To calculate Rank(Position), we first approximate daily positions by netting out the sell and buy trades in each
security over the fund’s trading history, setting any negative position to zero. Next, we create a normalized daily
percentile rank of each fund’s positions. A fund’s position with the estimated largest value at the beginning of a given
trading day receives a Rank(Position) value of 1 for that day, while the fund’s smallest position receives a
Rank(Position) value of 0. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and month-year. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), and log(DollVols,t).
Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of these with our four variables
of interest.

Table 2.C.2 – Relative past performance of a fund and trade-type
frequency around quarter-ends
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Initiating
Completing
One-off
Building
-0.0226**
0.0271*
0.0516***
-0.0560***
Qtr_End*Buy
(-2.42)
(1.88)
(2.95)
(-3.81)
-0.0427**
0.0384
0.0657***
-0.0614***
Qtr_End*Sell
(-2.36)
(1.33)
(3.82)
(-6.02)
0.0138*
-0.0035
0.0342**
-0.0445***
Qtr_Beg*Buy
(1.90)
(-0.37)
(2.35)
(-3.19)
0.0186*
-0.0004
0.0027
-0.0209
Qtr_Beg*Sell
(1.70)
(-0.05)
(0.17)
(-1.58)
0.0073
-0.0199
-0.0053
0.0179
Qtr_End*Buy*Rank(Return)
(0.54)
(-0.84)
(-0.20)
(0.96)
0.0184
-0.0149
-0.0413*
0.0378**
Qtr_End*Sell*Rank(Return)
(0.66)
(-0.33)
(-1.69)
(2.37)
0.0112
-0.0133
-0.0112
0.0134
Qtr_Beg*Buy*Rank(Return)
(0.96)
(-0.94)
(-0.46)
(0.60)
-0.0158
-0.0203*
0.0318
0.0043
Qtr_Beg*Sell*Rank(Return)
(-0.84)
(-1.79)
(1.24)
(0.21)
Fund fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Security-by-month fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Non-linear volume controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fund-flow controls and interactions
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Two-way clustered SE
Firm & Month
Firm & Month
Firm & Month
Firm & Month
0.023
0.025
0.107
0.128
Adjusted R-squared
50,170,968
50,170,968
50,170,968
50,170,968
Observations
This table reports regressions of our four trade type indicators (Initiating, Completing, One-off, Building) on the
interactions between indicators for dates around the change in quarters, Qtr_End and Qtr_Beg, indicators for whether the trade
was a purchase, Buy, or sale, Sell, and the normalized rank of the fund’s past performance, Rank(Return), and its interaction
with the quarter indicators. We also include other controls (see below), including Buy and the interactions of the Buy and
Sell indicators with Rank(Return), but for brevity, we do not report the coefficients on these additional controls.
Rank(Return) is computed as the monthly percentile rank of value-weighted return of the fund over a 12-month period ending
prior to the month of the trade. The fund with the best performance of the last 12 months receives a rank of 1 for that month,
while the worst-performing fund receives a rank of 0. The controls also include non-linear volume controls, fund flow controls
and their interactions with the quarter indicators. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and month-year. t-statistics are
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Non-linear volume controls: Signsharevols,t, ShareVols,t, Abs(ShareVols,t), log(ShareVols,t), DollVols,t, Abs(DollVols,t) and
log(DollVols,t).
Fund-flow controls: %FundFlows(t) and $FundFlows(t). We also include interactions of both with our four variables of
interest.
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